Regulation is all over the Indian economic landscape, and it is often conducted by ‘statutory regulatory authorities’. In this paper, we examine regulation in India through the lens of public economics, public administration, and the rule of law. Under conditions of market failure, there can be a case for state intervention through regulation. State failure in regulation can deliver various kinds of suboptimal outcomes including deficiencies on the rule of law, central planning and market failure. When regulatory organisations are constructed without adequate checks and balances, state personnel respond to incentives that yield arbitrary power, central planning, and organisational failure. Progress necessitates a departure from output-level engagements with regulatory staff. Root cause solutions require structural reforms to the laws governing regulators. The analysis delineates a framework for regulatory design grounded in the rule of law, separation of powers, and state capability. We need to go from the why of regulation (the economic ideas of market failures) to the how of regulation (which harnesses political science, law and public administration).
The paper reviews India's macro-development experience since 1980 and conducts a growth decomposition exercise. Our analysis reveals that the post-liberalization growth pick-up in India was mostly due to capital accumulation. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth remained tepid throughout and actually becoming negative post-2016. We show that at comparable levels of economic development countries like China and Korea grew much faster which was mostly sparked by rapid TFP growth. To understand India's growth challenge better we formalize a three-sector model with factor market and output market distortions. Using counterfactual exercises on the calibrated model, we find that labor market wedges significantly reduced aggregate output in India by distorting production away from Industry and Services. The measured output loss due to labor market wedges is over 30 percent. We also conduct projections for India in 2047. Unfortunately, even under the most optimistic TFP growth assumptions, the projected GDP of India falls well short of the $30tn target. Our results underscore the importance of ushering in labor market reforms and easing business conditions urgently.
Bihar’s development is central to India’s ambition of Viksit Bharat—to become a developed economy by 2047, given that Bihar has the second largest population and remains the poorest state. This paper provides a macroeconomic assessment of Bihar’s development trajectory, achievements so far, remaining challenges, and reform priorities. Bihar’s development story until the mid-2000s is complex—a combination of history, bad luck, and policy failures. This paper traces the reasons for the state’s decline under colonial rule and during the post-Independence period, followed by the post-2005 turnaround associated with a reform-minded government that came to power with the mandate to focus on development and governance. We document the positive results under the new government yet find that the reforms so far are incomplete to deliver high, inclusive, sustainable, and stable growth. The paper then highlights the remaining challenges and identifies six priority areas that are fundamental and interconnected to make a big push: education, health, governance and law and order, mitigation of recurring floods, private sector development, and women’s empowerment. These reforms are essential for raising productivity, accelerating structural transformation, and creating high-quality jobs for its young population. Recognising the scale of the required investment, the paper assesses Bihar’s public debt dynamics and sustainability and quantifies the fiscal effort needed to finance alternative reform scenarios through stronger own-revenue mobilisation, more efficient and effective spending, additional support from the central government, and, if needed, further borrowing. Bihar’s recent progress, favourable demographics, rising aspirations, natural resources, and scope to mobilise its large diaspora provide grounds for optimism, but sustained and coordinated reforms are necessary to achieve convergence with other states and realise its development potential.
India is one of the world’s largest producers of many agricultural commodities, yet it captures only a small share of global processed-food exports. This paper asks whether export-oriented food processing can provide a missing link between agricultural abundance, structural transformation, and better rural employment. Combining cross-country evidence on trade and productivity with Indian factory data, commodity-level comparisons, and case studies, it shows that processed food is a global market comparable in scale to apparel and has historically supported early industrialization. India nevertheless underperforms sharply: it holds about 14 percent of global arable land but less than 2 percent of processed-food exports, implying an annual export gap of roughly $50–110 billion. This underperformance reflects weak productivity growth in both cultivation and processing, unusually small formal plants, high energy costs, fragmented farm supply, inadequate quality-control systems, and unstable trade policy. Yet India’s success in shrimp, frozen French fries, and table grapes shows that firms and producer organizations can build competitive clusters by coordinating technology, inputs, standards, and procurement. The paper argues for policies that target the entire farm-to-export chain—linking processors, production bases, finance, infrastructure, affordable power, traceability, and stable market access—while ensuring that farmers share in the gains.
Contract labour in India is increasingly evolving from an instrument of labour cost arbitrage into a mechanism for labour intermediation and workforce management. Using establishment-level data spanning 2001–2023, we document a broad-based rise in contract labour, with contract workers accounting for more than 40 percent of manufacturing employment. Contrary to the traditional view of contract labour as low-wage and precarious employment, we find a substantial narrowing of the wage gap between con-tract and regular workers, together with improvements in minimum wage compliance. The expansion of contract labour is concentrated among larger, technologically advanced, more productive, and capital-intensive establishments. Reforms that increased flexibility in direct hiring did not reduce firms’ reliance on contract workers. Instead, districts with a stronger pre-existing staffing industry experienced larger increases in contract labour following reforms to the hiring of contract labour. Firms more exposed to higher formalisation and compliance requirements also experienced larger increases in contract worker shares. Overall, the evidence suggests that the continued growth of contract labour reflects the expansion of organised labour intermediation and has important implications for labour market policy.