India’s coal transition must overcome many challenges

As India forges ahead with its renewable energy goals to combat climate change, the transition away from coal presents a complex economic challenge.

As India forges ahead with its renewable energy goals to combat climate change, the transition away from coal presents a complex economic challenge. While the environmental urgency is clear, the macroeconomic consequences – especially those impacting employment and state finances – carry a weight that policymakers can no longer afford to overlook. Coal has long powered India’s economy, currently generating over 70 per cent of the country’s electricity. For several states, including Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha, coal is more than just a fuel – it supports budgets, livelihoods, and local development.

Jharkhand receives nearly 30 per cent of its own tax revenue from fossil fuelbased royalties and levies; Chhattisgarh follows closely. Together with a few other states, they account for most of India’s coal reserves and production, making the transition highly regional in both risk and impact. Moving away from coal will not be cheap. India is estimated to require about $900 billion to $1 trillion over the next three decades to fully steer its power sector away from fossil fuels. Nearly half of that cost will fund nonenergy needs – worker reskilling, land repurposing, livelihood support, and economic diversification.

These are not peripheral concerns; they are essential to making the energy transition socially and economically viable. Employment is where the transition dilemma becomes most immediate. Coal supports the livelihoods of over 13 million people across mining, transport, thermal power, steel, brick kilns, and other linked sectors. Formal employment numbers tell only part of the story. Many workers are hired through contractors or are informally engaged – making them both invisible in official data and vulnerable to job losses. In Jharkhand alone, nearly 300,000 are employed in formal coal work, with at least a million tied indirectly to the industry.

For these workers and their families, coal is far more than an energy source – it is a livelihood, a form of stability in regions where few other opportunities exist. Abrupt coal closures without alternative employment can lead to economic stagnation, deepened inequality, and long-term social stress. The risk isn’t just of stranded assets, but of stranded communities, where entire regions are left behind in the march to net zero. Renewable energy promises jobs – indeed, over a million people were working in India’s renewables sector in 2023, with strong growth expected. By 2030, the sector could generate up to 3.4 million jobs through new solar and wind capacity alone. Yet the shift from coal to clean energy jobs is not automatic.

There’s a skills gap – technical roles in solar and wind require formal training, digital literacy, and experience that most coal workers lack. Additionally, there is a regional gap. Most renewable investments are concentrated in western and southern India – Gujarat, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka – whereas the coal belt lies in the east and central regions. Even the nature of employment differs. Coal jobs, particularly those in the formal public sector, often offer better wages, benefits, and job security compared to many clean energy roles, which are more contractual and project-based.

Without planned efforts to bridge these gaps – through training, job matching, and wage support – the transition risks leaving workers worse off. Adding to the challenge is the heavy fiscal reliance on coal revenues. Between 2018 and 2023, Jharkhand alone earned nearly Rs 24,000 crore in coal royalties and contributions to mining funds. Chhattisgarh and Odisha followed with over Rs 16,000 crore each. These funds support health, education, infrastructure, and social programmes, and their depletion could undercut development in some of the most underserved districts in the country. Current mechanisms, such as the District Mineral Foundation (DMF) funds, while useful, are insufficient for the scale of transition needed. So far, DMF has accumulated just over $3.7 billion – far short of the $420 billion estimated need for non-energy transition elements. At the same time, India’s financial system remains deeply invested in coal.

Domestic banks have poured nearly $29 billion into coal since 2016, and public sector banks account for the majority of these loans. Realigning capital flows toward clean technologies and transition support will be vital. As India aims to achieve net zero target by 2070, new jobs will emerge in solar installation, EV maintenance, climate resilient agriculture and the circular economy sector. Skilling programmes can address unemployment, improve livelihood and support climate goals simultaneously. To ensure a smooth and inclusive transition, India must invest in large-scale reskilling tailored to the local needs of coal-dependent communities.

Programmes like Suryamitra, Vayumitra, Jal Urja Mitra – focused on solar, wind and small hydro power technician training respectively – are positive initiatives but need to be dramatically scaled up and adapted for broader participation. At the same time, coal-producing states need active support to diversify their economies – whether through green manufacturing, agro-based industries, or services that can generate stable employment. Social protection systems will also need expansion to cover informal workers, offering health coverage, pensions, and income support as they navigate career shifts. Importantly, the fiscal gap left by shrinking coal revenues cannot be ignored. The central government must devise mechanisms – possibly through compensatory transfers or green revenue-sharing models – to stabilize state finances during this transition period.

Without such support, the development gains funded by coal could reverse in many of India’s poorest districts. Finally, the transition must be participatory. Local communities, trade unions, grassroots leaders, and workers must be actively involved in shaping strategies for moving beyond coal. Top-down mandates will not suffice when livelihoods are at stake. India’s coal transition is more than an environmental necessity – it is a macroeconomic test of the country’s ability to align growth, equity, and sustainability. With the right planning and financial commitment, this can be a transformation that uplifts rather than displaces. But failure to address the human and regional aspects of the transition may fracture the very social and economic fabric it seeks to rebuild.

The writers are associated with the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER). Views are personal.

Will women’s quota in Bihar make a difference?

There are significant education gaps that need to be addressed. Support systems like creches and safe transport are vital.

In 2016, Bihar made headlines by reserving 35 per cent of all government jobs for women. It was a bold move — an attempt to do more than just include women on paper. The policy extended beyond just classrooms and panchayat halls, signalling that woman belonged in the workforce, in power, and in public institutions.

Fast forward to 2025, another election year. In a move aimed at localising the benefits of this reservation, the Bihar government has now said that only domicile women — those who are residents of the state — can claim that 35 per cent quota.

While this may bring the focus squarely on Bihar’s own women, it raises an important question: Are we enabling them to actually reach these jobs, or just limiting the pool without changing the playing field?

The good news is that more women in Bihar are participating in the workforce. According to the PLFS, Bihar’s female Worker Population Ratio has jumped from a dismal 4 per cent in 2017-18 to nearly 30 per cent in 2023-24. Much of this growth is happening in rural areas.

But here’s the catch — it’s not stable or formal work. In rural Bihar, self employment has ballooned from 35 per cent to a staggering 85 per cent —but mostly as unpaid “helpers” in family enterprises, not as owners or entrepreneurs. Urban women saw a similar trend. The number of those running small businesses or working on their own remained steady, while “helper” roles jumped from 3 per cent to 29 per cent.

Meanwhile, despite quota in place salaried jobs have been shrinking —rural women in regular jobs fell from 27.8 per cent to just 3.6 per cent. Urban salaried jobs among women halved too, from 63 per cent to 30 per cent.

So, yes, women are working more. But they’re not climbing up the ladder — they’re being pushed into informal, often unpaid or insecure roles. That’s not empowerment. That’s survival.

The education gap

For a job reservation to work, women have to be eligible. And that starts with education. In rural Bihar, nearly 45 per cent of women were still illiterate in 2023-24. In urban areas, it’s 27 per cent. Just 3.1 per cent of rural women and 13.4 per cent of urban women held a graduate degree in 2023-24 — barely an increase from 2017-18. Higher secondary education is slowly improving but remains out of reach for most.

Even where girls are enrolled in school, a 2024 study from IIT Patna found that gender norms continue to push them away from competitive subjects like science, law, and public administration — fields that often lead to government jobs.

So, while the quota exists, how many women will actually qualify to claim it?

Another invisible hurdle is time — or the lack of it. According to the Time Use Survey 2024, Bihari women, both urban and rural, spend about five more hours a day than men on unpaid domestic and care work. That’s cooking, cleaning, caregiving — tasks rarely counted as “real work,” but which fill the majority of their day.

Unsurprisingly, per IWWAGE data, around 70 per cent of women in Bihar cite domestic duties as their main reason for not being in the workforce.

Without support systems — like child care centres (creches), safe transport, or flexible work — many women simply don’t have the time to take on paid employment, even if they want to.

On paper, Bihar’s 35 per cent reservation for women looks visionary. And the new domicile clause may seem like a push to make it more targeted. But without investments in education, skilling, child care, housing, and public perception of women’s roles, the policy risks becoming another missed opportunity.

What we need isn’t just a quota. We need to clear the road so that women can walk it.

It’s time Bihar stops framing women’s employment as a symbolic gesture and starts treating it as a structural priority. Otherwise, we’re just making promises on paper — when what women really need is a chance to show up and thrive.

The writer is associate fellow at NCAER, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal.

Public Financing for Renewable Energy Sector Development: Recommendations for the 16th Finance Commission

India has pledged to reach net zero emissions by 2070, and set an ambitious renewable energy (RE) target of 500 GW from non-fossil sources by 2030. At present, total RE-based electricity generation capacity in India is 220.10 GW (31 March 2025). To achieve its climate goals, it is essential for India to strengthen its RE sector at both the national and subnational levels to harness its potential.

In this paper, we analyse public sector expenditure on the RE sector, and discuss the public finance strategies adopted by states, their utilisation rates, and priorities in public expenditure in terms of schemes and subsidies related to RE. Based on our analysis we have formulated recommendations for the 16th Finance Commission. We have estimated the amount of green grants for states, taking into account the potential and progress in various RE sectors across states. We also discuss the challenges and list short-term recommendations (the low-hanging fruit) and long-term recommendations to enhance states’ performance in achieving the targets of the green transition.

Our analysis shows that while fore-runner states in terms of public expenditure on RE, like Chhattisgarh, prioritise subsidies for solar pumps, Gujarat demonstrates a more diversified approach, investing in large-scale solar-wind hybrid parks, microgrids, and decentralised systems. In contrast, Rajasthan, despite its high renewable potential, spends a very small share of its budget on RE. Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Tripura, and Jammu & Kashmir have no identifiable budgeted spending for RE through public finances, while Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Assam, and Telangana spend a miniscule amount from their budgets (less than 0.01%) on RE. The majority of the states spend more on revenue than on capital, resulting in the lack of asset creation and infrastructural support in this sector. States also suffer from poor fiscal planning. Haryana, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, and Maharashtra spend significantly on subsidies for renewables, while Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, though providing subsidies on other components of the energy sector, do not report giving subsidies for RE. These differences underscore the need for strategic, well-targeted financing that aligns state actions with their technical and economic potential.

Renewable energy technologies are highly capital-intensive with substantial upfront costs. Both government entities and other financial lenders have a back-log of non-performing assets (NPAs), and the uncertainty of investments returns in this sector makes long-term financing stressful. The financial health of DISCOMs and the lack of green priority specifications in financial frameworks add to the problem. The RE sector, being at a nascent stage of development, also faces substantial operational and institutional challenges like land acquisition, technical and regulatory barriers to solar rooftop panels, poor transmission infrastructure, policy misalignments between central and state governments, and so on. A lack of awareness which creates resistance to the adoption of RE and land-use conflicts are also concerns. To overcome these challenges, this study includes a list of recommended financial incentives, and infrastructural and regulatory support, and an approach toward public expenditure on this sector.

Our study suggests that to meet the government RE target of installed capacity of 500GW by 2030, the Finance Commission needs to provide green energy grants to states. We estimate that, considering the potential, installed capacity, and present trend in spending on new energy and RE, the average yearly grant requirement for all states would be around Rs. 14,064 crore over the next five years to reach this target. Given the high risks and low returns in this sector, public investment must lead the way.

NCAER News: July 2025

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The Greening of Thar Desert: A Mirage of Progress with Deep Fault Lines

The Thar Desert, India’s iconic sea of golden sand dunes and steadfast desert cultures, is undergoing a dramatic transformation—one that is as mesmerizing as it is misleading. Global headlines now highlight its unexpected metamorphosis not into a harsher wasteland, but into a surprisingly green zone. Over the past two decades, satellite imagery has confirmed a 38% spike in vegetation, and once-arid townships are now framed by pockets of farmland and greenery.

At first glance, this appears to be a success story of climate resilience and human progress. Yet beneath this emerald veneer lies a fragile foundation. The desert may be turning green—but at serious ecological, climatic, and hydrological costs that threaten to undo the very gains that make this transformation seem remarkable.

Why is the Thar Turning Green?

This ecological shift owes its momentum to two intertwined forces: increased monsoon rainfall and widespread groundwater extraction.

India’s northwest has witnessed a 64% rise in monsoon rainfall since 2001, extending the growing season for Kharif crops and enabling pastures to flourish. Seasonal rains have helped trigger a temporary surge in vegetation, giving the landscape a vibrant facelift.

However, groundwater extraction is the more powerful force behind lasting greening trends. About 55% of the annual vegetation growth and 67% of non-monsoon greenness is attributed to groundwater irrigation. A sprawling web of solar-powered tubewells and pumps digs deep into aquifers, pulling out “fossil water” accumulated over centuries. This enables year-round farming and supports rapidly expanding settlements in otherwise inhospitable terrain. Between 1980 and 2015, cropland area in the Thar surged by 74%, while irrigated land expanded by 24%.

Meanwhile, mega-infrastructure like the Indira Gandhi Canal has re-engineered vast districts of the desert. Combined with India’s highest desert population density, the Thar is now a place of relentless transformation—more towns, more farms, more people, and more demand. Urban areas in and around the Thar shrank from human outposts to burgeoning cities, swelling by 50% to 800% between 1985 and 2020. 

The Mirage of Prosperity

What appears to be a green revolution is, in truth, an ecological and hydrological gamble—a desert being dragged beyond its limits in the name of short-term development.

1. Groundwater Bonanza, Groundwater Collapse

Despite increased rainfall, less than 7% of it percolates into aquifers, with the rest lost to evaporation. The booming greenery is riding on a finite reserve of ancient water, which is being consumed far quicker than it can be replenished. Over-extraction has led to dropping water tables, rising salinity, and more drying borewells across the region.

As agriculture intensifies and urban areas sprawl, water demands are accelerating amid climate instability. If current patterns of use continue, much of this “green” could collapse into a severe water crisis, compromising food security, wiping out rural livelihoods, and endangering urban resilience.

2. Ecological Disruption and the Loss of the Desert’s Soul

Deserts are not empty spaces—they are rich, ancient ecosystems designed for scarcity. The Thar supports unique flora and fauna adapted to harsh conditions, as well as carefully balanced grasslands vital to pastoralist cultures.

Greening interventions risk erasing this delicate ecosystem. Unregulated afforestation, tree plantations, irrigation-fed agriculture, and habitat loss endanger native species and nomadic ways of life. As conservationist Abi Vanak cautions, “Planting trees in deserts is as bad as cutting trees in a rainforest.” The issue isn’t greenery per se, but that non-native interventions alter the fundamental character of the landscape.

3. Climate Paradoxes and Uncertain Futures

Perhaps the most dangerous illusion in the ongoing greening is a false sense of climate security. While the rains have been generous lately, climate models project volatile and unpredictable rainfall in coming decades—alongside rising temperatures and more frequent droughts.

Towns, crops, and infrastructure built today may not withstand the Thar of tomorrow. The greening also alters the land’s albedo (reflectivity), disrupting patterns of heat exchange, moisture circulation, and energy flows between the land and atmosphere, with unpredictable feedbacks on local and global climate systems.

What Should the Future Hold?

The story of the Thar’s greening is a stark reminder that not all environmental change is progress. It showcases how human innovation can temporarily override the starkness of a desert—but also how easily such efforts can become unsustainable.

If the current trajectory continues, today’s green boom may collapse into tomorrow’s water crisis, ecosystem degradation, and economic decline. The desert’s transformation needs redirection—from surface-level productivity to long-term sustainability.

This requires swift and decisive shifts in policy and practice. Water management must be driven by science, aligning usage with recharge rates. Groundwater extraction must be actively regulated before it’s too late. Cities and farms must be tailored to the desert’s ecological boundaries, favouring climate-appropriate crops and development strategies. Most crucially, the Thar’s dryland biodiversity—plant, animal, and cultural—must be protected, not bulldozed over in pursuit of artificial greenery.

The desert’s new green veil may inspire awe, but it is, in many ways, a mirage—one that lures us with short-term rewards while hiding deep fault lines. As we marvel at what appears to be ecological regeneration, we must confront the hard question: Green, yes—but at what cost?

Only through honest reckoning and deliberate course correction can we turn the Thar’s story from ecological illusion into enduring transformation.

Mr. Raktimava Bose is associated with National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and Dr. Sreoshi Banerjee is associated with Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). Views are personal.

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