The IHDS Forum is a monthly update of publications, op-eds and data news based on the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), which was jointly conducted by NCAER and the University of Maryland in two waves, in 2004-05 and 2011-12. Preparations are underway for launching the third wave soon.
Our newsletter keeps you informed about our work: studies, publications, Op-Eds, events, other research engagements and discussions on various topics. You will find the back issues of the NCAER Newsletter below:
The batteries would require frequent charging. Trolley buses quite similar to trams are a better option.
With commitment of net zero emission by 2070 India is on a war footing to reduce her carbon footprint in all sector of economy.
As transport sector is a big emitter of GHG emission due to our over dependence of fossil based vehicles efforts are being made to look for alternative fuel sources for transport sector. All major urban transport corporations are now in a hurry to switch their fleet of GHG emitted buses to something that is clean.
NITI Aayog has given a big push towards battery operated electric vehicles both as medium for personal transport as well as for public transport. Thus we see most of the urban transport corporations now going for battery operated buses to replace diesel based buses as mainstay of urban transport system. CNG buses which are prevalent in many big cities are no more being encouraged. The battery operated buses seem to be the vehicle of the future. Of course metros are now being constructed in many more cities including tier 2 cities to move commuter in a faster and non-polluting ways.
However one should recognise that urban transport system based on battery operated electric buses (EV) have several inherent disadvantages.
The minuses
Firstly battery operated EV costs much more than fossil based buses. Moreover as the batteries don’t last long enough for a full day’s work buses have to swap in and out of service. To run the same frequency that used to be provided with CNG/Diesel buses an urban transport corporation has to maintain nearly twice the number of CNG/Diesel buses.
As battery life is limited the life of such vehicle is shorter than that of CNG/Diesel buses. Furthermore the disposal of used batteries is an issue as this is a hazardous material. Not much attention has been paid on this aspect while going for the vigorous push for electric vehicles.
In hindsight there have been multiple corporate players who have a stake in battery operated EV buses. No doubt they have been lobbying intensively with the government for this transition. However once we turn our gaze to the rest of the world there is not much evidence to show that battery operated electric bus is the preferred choice for urban transport system.
The light railways system or trams forms part of the urban transport system in most of the major cities of the world. Of course in India the trams are currently operated in Kolkata albeit on a limited scale. The trolley bus system is operated in 280 cities around the world and is on a growing trend. In India it used to be operated in Mumbai but was discontinued in the early 1970s.
Compared to trams the installation of trolley buses is cheaper and they do not require laying of lines or dedicated corridor. Since a trolleybus operates on rubber pneumatics (unlike tram) which cannot close the circuit its electrical energy supply must be insured by two trolley poles which are in constant contact with two contact conductors ( and -) under direct voltage.
The trolleys are swivel-attached to the roof of the trolleybus and generally have a length of about 6 metres which leaves to the trolleybus freedom of lateral movement of up to 4.5 metres. Thus unlike tram it does not add to traffic congestion and operates more like an ordinary bus.
Advantage trolleybus
Modern electric trolley buses are clean reliable and relatively inexpensive to maintain. India should adopt this for multiple reasons.These are proven technology and have a longer useful life than any battery electric bus.
So a trolley bus system is significantly cheaper to run even factoring in the maintenance of overhead wires. Electric trolley buses currently have advantages in terms of capacity proven lifecycle performance daily performance for high volume and high frequency routes.
Since electric trolley buses don’t have to carry big heavy batteries on board they offer additional seating capacity which makes a big difference on high demand routes.
Finally battery buses need additional time to recharge (fast charging technology remains at a suboptimal stage) and tend to get many fewer real world miles than advertised meaning the buses can’t complete as many runs in a day.
As a result transit agencies have found that they must purchase additional battery electric buses to run the same service than then they would need with electric trolley buses.
Thus purchasing battery electric buses is not an operationally sensible idea. Moreover battery operated electric bus costs more than a trolley bus. Moreover as India is dependent on imported batteries for vehicles trolley bus system is a better bet for Atmanirbhar Bharat. On top of it disposal of used battery is an issue one needs to be factored in while making a policy decision.
Recently there was an important innovation that combines the flexibility of running without trolley wire and the reliability of the trolleybus called in-motion charging. Current trolley buses have small batteries designed to allow the bus to go off-wire for a fraction of a mile to detour around obstacles.
In-motion charging expands this concept by equipping the bus with enough battery for about five miles of off-wire travel. This technology is increasingly popular in small Central European cities because it allows all the advantages of trolley wire while allowing the avoidance of the most difficult (and expensive) points of installation and maintenance (i.e. intersections rotaries and low underpasses).
Given these multiple advantages India needs to go for trolley bus system for urban transport system.
The writer Sanjib Pohit is Professor at NCAER Delhi. The views expressed are personal.
The IEPF Chair Unit at NCAER prepared a Report on the perception-based external evaluation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IIBI). The study was led under the guidance of Dr K.P. Krishnan, IEPF Chair Professor with a core team of staff which included Ms Amrita Pillai, Mr Sudipto Banerjee, and Mr Karan Gulati. The salient findings of the study are enumerated below:
The IBBI acts as Statutory Regulatory Authority (SRA) under Section 196 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 performing Executive, Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-judicial functions at the same time. The integration of these functions in one body poses risks as it violates the principle of separation of powers.
Therefore, a periodic review or evaluation of the performance of SRAs is a crucial measure to establish credibility and regulatory relevance. Regulatory performance evaluations in other jurisdictions are reported to have resulted in improvements in consumer protection, the internal governance arrangements of the regulator, and the legal landscape. The IBBI is a frontrunner in good regulatory practices among Indian SRAs. In its last self-evaluation, the IBBI Governing Board rated the IBBI performance as ‘93% Excellent’.
The IEPF Chair Unit at NCAER undertook the first-ever external evaluation of IBBI with the objective of assessing the regulatory quality of the institution. The framework for IBBI’s evaluation had two pillars: (i) governance, and (ii) fulfilment of statutory powers and functions. The constituent elements of the pillars were further classified under broad sub-heads with levels of achievement scores on each pillar. As many as 97 performance indicators were developed and measured on achievements. When the regulator fulfils the desired action, consistent with the Code and other benchmarks of good regulatory governance practices, it was assigned an ‘Excellent’ rating. Where there was scope to improve how an action is to be carried out, a ‘Satisfactory’ rating was assigned. In case where a written response from the regulator confirmed that an action was not yet fulfilled, or there was no publicly available evidence of the regulator fulfilling the desired action, it was rated ‘Poor’. Two other aspects of importance for the functioning of the IBBI were also recorded. The first was resource constraints – financial, human and physical – faced by the IBBI, and the second was the perception of service providers regarding their regulator. These two aspects, while recorded in a detailed manner, were not scored.
Based on the above methodology, the IBBI was rated ‘Excellent’ on approximately 77% of the total 97 indicators that were used to evaluate its performance. The IBBI was rated ‘Poor’, i.e. not undertaking the desired action, on only 6 out of the total 97 indicators used for evaluation. Stakeholder satisfaction was also assessed, and suggestions were made to improve that.
It was felt that given the schema of financial arrangements in the IBBI, it may be inappropriate to score it on actions over which it does not have complete control, but these aspects were documented in the Report. Potential areas of improvement to strengthen regulatory governance have also been highlighted along with suggestions for the future evaluations.
Opinion: K P Krishnan
Parliament has to reconcile the twin challenge of protecting people not just from data fiduciaries but also from the protector itself.
The Personal Data Protection Bill (Bill) was introduced in the Lok Sabha in December 2019 and referred to a joint parliamentary committee (JPC). The JPC submitted its report recently. The original Bill was aimed at protecting personal data. The JPC felt that it is impossible to distinguish between personal and non-personal data. Hence it recommended that the Bill should provide for the protection of all data and it is now recommended to become the Data Protection Bill.
Experts have commented on domain issues dealt with in the Bill and the report. This piece will focus on an important but less discussed aspect of the Bill namely the design of the statutory regulatory authority (SRA). The Bill sets up a Data Protection Authority (DPA) which is empowered to take steps to protect the interests of individuals prevent the misuse of personal data and ensure compliance with the Bill.
Very broadly “regulation” is interventions by public agencies to correct market failure by inducing modification or change in behaviour in the activities of a target population. “Regulation” by the SRAs is more than just administrative interventions.
Chapter XIV of the Bill empowers the DPA to make regulations to carry out the provisions of the Bill. It lists specific areas for regulation besides an all-encompassing omnibus clause. In addition according to chapter IX of the Bill the DPA has the power and the duty to promote good data protection practices and facilitate compliance. These will also be effected through regulations made by the DPA and hence will have the force of law. These codes will be to ensure the quality of the data its retention its processing including obtaining of consent standards of security safeguards anonymisation etc. This chapter also has the all-encompassing omnibus general clause.
This arrangement is not unusual in India but it is important to understand how “regulation” works. A parliamentary legislation empowers an SRA to make subordinate regulate the substance of the domain. In effect the DPA will “legislate” extensively on this domain. More of the legal rights and obligations for us will flow from regulations made by the DPA and less from parliamentary law.
In addition according to chapter IX of the Bill the DPA has the powers of a civil court to call for information as well as conduct inquiries on data fiduciaries. Based on these inquiries the DPA can pass orders including suspension cancellation or modification of the registration granted to a data fiduciary. So in the extreme case the DPA can deny the right of that entity to carry on the business of a data fiduciary —a fundamental right under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. Further in accordance with the provisions of chapter X of the Bill for statutory non-compliance the DPA can impose penalties which can go up to 4 per cent of the total worldwide turnover of the data fiduciary!
These are what we understand as judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The DPA which in the previous paragraph emerged as the principal legislator for “regulation” of data protection has also emerged as the first level adjudicator for violations of the very legislation that it wrote and inquired into.
It should be clear now even to the layperson that the DPA is more than a department. It is a mini-state as it is empowered to legislate implement the legislation as well as adjudicate on disputes with external agents on the very legislation that it writes and enforces. But we all thought that the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances were part of the basic structure of our Constitution?
Way back in 2004 the Supreme Court stated in the context of the SEBI Act that “… Integration of powers by vesting legislative executive & judicial powers in the same body in future may raise several public law concerns”. In recent times courts have been less forgiving and increasing their scrutiny and setting aside more regulatory actions than in the past.
Domains like data protection and finance (crypto assets fintech as examples) require “regulation” of the kind described above. They are technical and are characterised by fast and continuously evolving developments. Hence nimble-footed legislative responses and speedy adjudication by the same expert agency are perhaps a necessary evil. The challenge however is to reconcile this necessity with fundamental principles of Indian Constitutional rule of law.
Nearly a decade ago the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC) had recommended a comprehensive framework for governance and accountability of SRAs including internal and external checks and balances. These included measures for a strong and independent board rigorous selection of board members empowering boards of SRAs to be an oversight on management greater accountability of SRAs to Parliament and greater transparency and outreach. Other best practices have also begun to be developed by more recent Indian SRAs. In a slight departure from other regulatory legislation section 196(1)(s) of the India Bankruptcy Code 2016 requires the regulator the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) to “specify mechanisms for issuing regulations including the conduct of public consultation processes before notification of any regulations”. Going beyond this limited requirement the IBBI issued the IBBI (Mechanism for Issuing Regulations) 2018 and built in the requirement of an economic analysis of every regulation and a review of regulations every three years to decide on their continuance.
With a DPA that is personned entirely by whole- time members silence on regulation-making process and allowing instruments like “directions” which are not subject to the rigour applicable to “regulations” the Bill and the JPC report have unfortunately missed this entire aspect of regulatory design and governance. Hopefully the government will incorporate these essential design features in the proposed DPA framework when finalising the Bill. It is important to note that given the nature of the domain nearly every Indian and every commercial activity would be in the DPA’s ambit. Indians certainly need protection of their data. With an omnipotent DPA an ominous Latin phrase comes to mind: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes (Who will guard the guardian?).
The writer is professor at NCAER member of a few for-profit and not-for- profit boards and former civil servant. Views expressed in the article are personal.