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New GDP series, charting the path ahead

Updating the ASI sampling frame and refining the ASUSE survey methodology can further enhance the accuracy and reliability of GDP and GSDP estimates.

A much-awaited new GDP series with the base year as 2022-23 is now available in the public domain. On February 27, 2026, the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation came out with a press note on a new series of GDP estimates and related aggregates for the financial years 2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25. This addresses the long-standing demand for a more accurate and realistic picture of the size of the Indian economy by updating the base year. It overcomes the limitations of earlier estimates, which relied on the outdated 2011–12 base year.

The overall size of the Indian economy in terms of GDP as per the new series at current prices (in rupees lakh crore) is estimated to be 261.18 (financial year 2022-23), 289.84 (FY2023-24) and 318.07 (2024-25), respectively (first revised estimate). These aggregates are marginally (between 3% and 4%) lower than what were released earlier based on the previous series. The relative shares of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors in total Gross Value Added (GVA) at current prices during 2024-25 remained at 21.4%, 25.8% and52.9%, respectively. The manufacturing sector depicts a high growth rate (more than 9%) in real GVA for both the years: 12.7% in 2023-24 and 9.3% in 2024-25. As regards the expenditure side estimates, the share of private financial consumption expenditure in GDP is around 56%, both at current and constant prices during the years 2023-24 and2024-25.

Major refinements in the new series

Some of the most significant refinements in the methodology adopted in the new series include: first, segregation of activities of multi-activity enterprises belonging to non-financial private corporate sector by apportioning the total GVA of the enterprise across its business activities using the corresponding revenue share information of the company available in the form of MGT 7/7A data (as against entire GVA being allocated to the major activity of the enterprise in 2011-12 series); second, use of a separate blown up factor at the industry x size class level, based on paid-up capital, for scaling up the GVA of the reported active companies to account for the contribution of the active companies which did not file returns; third, a comprehensive coverage of Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) using Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) data; and fourth, the use of high-frequency (annual) data on GVA per worker (GVAPW) as per the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises (ASUSE) in conjunction with the estimates of the number of workers utilising the information available through Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) to estimate the GVA contribution of the Household Sector. In this context, it is worthwhile to mention that in the 2011-12 series, base year (2011-12) GVA estimates at the activity level for the Household Sector were extrapolated using suitable indicators to derive GVA for subsequent years.

The new series also introduces significant improvements in the estimation of real GVA through the expanded application of ‘double deflation’ and ‘volume extrapolation’ methods, bringing the estimates more in line with international guidelines. In addition, the benchmark estimates for 2022–23 private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) are now derived more directly by utilising data from the Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES 2022–23), especially for items that are widely consumed across household groups and tend to exhibit low income elasticity.

The challenges ahead

Among the four institutional sectors, namely, general government, public corporations, private corporations and households for which GVA estimates are separately computed and then aggregated, the database of the first two sectors is quite robust. Coming to the private corporate sector, particularly the private non-financial corporate segment, for which GVA is compiled using the MCA database — a critical issue lies in allocating the national-level total GVA of companies across States to derive the corresponding Gross State Value Added (GSVA), given that the primary data are available only at the enterprise level.

In the 2011-12 series, total manufacturing GVA at the national level was allocated proportionately over States by using their shares in GVA as per the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). In the new series, apart from ASI data (confining to manufacturing sector), the GST data is also available for this purpose. A major limitation with the ASI data is the inadequacy of the ASI frame. To illustrate, the number of companies in 2011-12, as on December 15, 2014, as per the MCA database classified under ‘Manufacturing’ was 135,802 (source: Changes in Methodology and Data Sources in the New Series of National Accounts, Base Year 2011-12, Central Statistics Office, 2015) as against only 67,649 factories covered under the corporate sector in ASI, 2011-12 (Table 7, Principal Characteristics by Type of Organisation in ASI 2011-2012 (Revised)). Accordingly, the proportionate shares of different States in the total GVA derived from the ASI based on a truncated frame may not reflect the reality and hence affect the State GDP figure. Remedial measures to improve the sampling frame of ASI by utilising the MCA and GST databases can be a step in the right direction. In parallel, a properly designed sample survey of active companies could be worth exploring to derive the percentage shares of different States in total GVA by the companies.

Resolving fluctuations

As regards the Household Sector, its GVA at the activity, i.e., ‘compilation category’ level in the new series is derived as the product of GVAPW as per the ASUSE and number of workers based on the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS). This necessitates that the corresponding estimates from the surveys are fairly reliable. However, available results from the ASUSE indicate a certain volatility in the estimates across the years for some industries and States.

For example, the all-India annual estimates of GVAPW (rural and urban combined) as per the ASUSE (covering both household sector and ‘quasi-corporate’ units) for the years2021-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24 were found to be ₹163,078; ₹255,447; and ₹ 201,930, respectively, for the ‘manufacture of rubber and plastic products’ which is a distinct compilation category in GDP calculations.

Similarly, the annual estimates of GVAPW pertaining to the manufacturing industry in respect of Bihar were found to be ₹89,638; ₹117,021; and ₹100,101, respectively, for the three years. To address this problem, the methodology in the new series recommends the use of three years’ moving average, wherever necessary, except for the base year. However, in resolving the issue of such fluctuations in the annual estimates of GVAPW, it may be worth exploring whether a rotating panel design in the ASUSE with a substantial overlap in the samples between any two consecutive years — similar to the procedure adopted in the PLFS — can yield better estimates.

Finally, to conclude, updating the ASI frame and refinements in the survey methodology of ASUSE can be effective in further improvement of the GDP and GSDP estimates.

G.C. Manna is a professor at the Institute for Human Development, Senior Adviser at the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), and a Member of the Advisory Committee on National Accounts Statistics. The views epxressed are personal.

When philanthropy is less leap of faith, more numbers game

In a climate where outcome monitoring, scaling up, and sustainability are the main buzzwords, grassroots organisations that speak from the heart are likely to be deprived of resources and public attention

The 21st century saw the emergence of a new philosophy for voluntary organisations. Good intentions were no longer enough, scale and outcome monitoring became the new gold standard. The California consensus, driven by the philanthropic impulses of tech billionaires, impatiently sought rapid societal change rooted in science and technology. This was a departure from the philosophy of institution-building favoured by foundations like Ford and Rockefeller. The traditional idea of selfless service was no longer sufficient; new philanthropists demanded measurable results. Ostensibly, it made sense that recipients of public funding should be held accountable. But what if this search for scale and accountability is ultimately counterproductive?

Microfinance programmes have been praised for high repayment rates in group lending to women by Grameen Bank and BRAC. However, Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta find that pressure on fieldworkers and group members to achieve high repayment rates has led them to selectively choose recipients based on their ability to repay, often excluding the poorest, least educated, and least connected. When outcome measures become the main criteria for judging programmes and institutions, it is not surprising that they lose sight of their original goals and become focused on maximising performance on outcome metrics.

Randomised evaluations, the foundation of rigorous programme assessment, are complex and often methodologically fraught. What happens in one place can influence another. Analysis of the effect of savings groups on income in Uganda and Malawi by Christopher Heitzig and Rossa O’Keeffe-O’Donovan finds that rising incomes in villages that implemented savings groups also impacted nearby villages. As a result, about 23-28 per cent of the programme’s benefits were not captured. Without careful attention to spillover effects, we might wrongly conclude that a programme has failed even when it has succeeded.

A focus on scale introduces other challenges. Transformative social programmes are often bottom-up, emphasising processes that need participation and buy-in from local communities. They may not be easily scaled, and the idea that a programme is only valuable if it can reach hundreds of millions of people might be counterproductive. In their book, John List and colleagues enumerate examples of projects that fail to scale globally. Closer to home, consider Lok Jumbish, a primary education programme in Rajasthan. Lok Jumbish was a highly participatory programme in which the community was mobilised to create a village education plan. It was so successful that the World Bank and the Indian government collaborated to scale up some of these ideas into a larger District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) that eventually covered 272 districts and 18 states as a centrally sponsored scheme.

A comparison of Lok Jumbish and DPEP by Tomako Kobayashi highlights their differences and notes the shallow local participation in Village Education Committees of DPEP compared to the deep, passionate engagement in Lok Jumbish. Evaluation of DPEP by the World Bank shows that while the programme was successful in increasing initial enrolment, it did not achieve its goal of reducing dropout rates or improving learning achievement.

Arguably, the most significant critique of the California consensus — which has now entered the vocabulary of Indian philanthropy and policymaking — is that it has shifted the landscape of civil society activism from passion and commitment to technocracy. In a climate where outcome monitoring, scaling up, and sustainability are the main buzzwords, grassroots organisations that speak from the heart are likely to be deprived of resources and public attention.

India is home to some of the greatest transformative movements — Satyagraha and non-violence, land reform, dairy cooperatives, the Chipko Movement — all rooted in grassroots civic action. Each was a leap of faith, each generated energy that gave rise to a nation of a thousand movements. Let us not allow the space for civic action to shrink in the pursuit of the holy grail of outcome monitoring.

The writer is professor, NCAER-National Data Innovation Centre and University of Maryland. Views are personal

Correcting Market and Regulatory Failures in Agri-Waste Value Chains

Agricultural waste has latent value but is often treated as a disposal problem. What are the core market and policy distortions in India that prevent by-product markets (e.g. bio-inputs, bioenergy, biomaterials) from emerging at scale, and how should policy reframe incentives to internalise environmental and social benefits?

Agricultural residues, such as straw, husk, and dung, carry economic value but are treated as disposal liabilities because prevailing price signals reward linear use. Open burning or dumping is often cheaper than aggregation and market linkage. At the same time, fossil fuels and chemical fertilisers benefit from entrenched subsidies, while bio-based inputs and energy alternatives face limited and uncertain support. This skews relative competitiveness. Farmers also bear the private costs of residue management, while the gains from cleaner air, soil health, and lower emissions accrue to society – an externality that weakens individual incentives.

Policy needs to internalise these environmental and social benefits. This includes calibrated disincentives for polluting practices, alongside positive incentives for supplying biomass into formal value chains. Public investment in aggregation centres, shared machinery banks, and concessional or blended finance for bio-based enterprises can reduce entry barriers. Demand-side tools, including carbon markets and green public procurement – such as government procurement of bio-CNG buses – can create predictable offtake. In Punjab, purchasing paddy straw for biomass power plants illustrates how correcting incentives can simultaneously raise farm incomes and reduce pollution.

Creating circular pathways requires coordination between farmers, aggregators, processors, and end-product markets. What institutional frameworks or contractual innovations are necessary to overcome fragmentation in these multi-actor chains, and how should policy balance efficiency with equitable value sharing among smallholders?

Circular pathways depend less on technology alone and more on institutional architecture. India’s smallholder-dominated agriculture makes individual participation in biomass markets unviable at scale. Fragmentation raises transaction costs, weakens bargaining power, and increases supply uncertainty for processors.

Farmer Producer Organisations (FPOs) provide a structural solution by aggregating residues, standardising quality, and negotiating contracts. Medium-term supply agreements between FPOs and processors, for example, a composting firm contracting sugarcane residue from an FPO in Maharashtra, can stabilise volumes and prices. These contracts should embed risk-sharing provisions so that farmers are not fully exposed to losses if a processing plant shuts down or demand fluctuates.

Public policy has a complementary role: enabling storage and preprocessing infrastructure; establishing quality standards aligned with industrial requirements; and promoting transparent digital platforms to record quantity, quality, and payments. Efficiency gains must not concentrate value among intermediaries. Equitable value-sharing mechanisms – through collective bargaining and fair-pricing norms – ensure that smallholders participate as stakeholders in the circular economy, not merely as low-margin suppliers.

Converting agri-waste into high-value products often spans multiple regulatory domains (fertilisers, energy, plastics, food safety). How should regulatory frameworks be harmonised to reduce compliance friction and stimulate innovation in circular solutions without compromising safety and environmental safeguards?

Agri-waste valorisation sits at the intersection of fertiliser regulation, renewable energy policy, pollution control, industrial licensing, and sometimes food or materials standards. Fragmented approvals across agriculture, environment, and industry departments create compliance friction, particularly for start-ups and smaller enterprises. A bio-fertiliser producer, for instance, may require parallel clearances under multiple regimes, slowing deployment even where technologies are low risk.

Regulatory reform should focus on harmonisation rather than dilution. A coordinated single-window clearance mechanism for circular economy projects can reduce procedural duplication. Standards across ministries should be aligned to avoid conflicting requirements, with differentiated fast-track pathways for technologies that meet predefined environmental and safety benchmarks. Digital compliance tools, such as traceability systems for biomass supply, can strengthen transparency while lowering monitoring costs.

Once technical norms, such as bio-CNG support programmes, are set at the national level, state-level approvals should align automatically to prevent avoidable delays. Predictable, coherent regulation encourages investment and innovation while preserving environmental safeguards and public health protections.

How domestic chores constrain women’s work

Schemes to raise women’s workforce participation will come a cropper unless men actively take part in domestic work.

Even as policy efforts are being oriented towards ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’through women-led development, a large chunk of women in India remains absent from paid employment, a reality that undermines both gender equality and economic growth. Over the past two decades, some initiatives like skill development programmes, entrepreneurship support, investment in child care, and flexible work arrangements have sought to raise women’s participation in paid employment. Yet, these measures have not yielded the desired results.

Currently, only about a third of Indian women participate in the labour force, far below most developed economies and roughly half of the levels in Scandinavian countries. It is even lower than several lower-middle-income countries like Bangladesh. This persistent gap reflects a deeper, structural inequity. Women are encouraged to enter paid employment without a corresponding reduction in their unpaid domestic and care work that consumes much of their day. Without addressing this imbalance, the gains from these policies will remain limited.

Data points

The National Statistical Office’s Time Use Survey (2024) makes this im-balance visible. Among young adults aged 15–29 years, women spend over five hours a day on unpaid domestic and care work, while men spend just half an hour. Absence of women from the labour market, therefore, often reflects not inactivity but their engagement in unpaid work. Men, meanwhile, devote roughly four and a half hours daily to paid employment. In contrast, Scandinavian countries, where domestic work is shared more evenly with men spending three or more hours a day on housework, consistently record higher and more stable female labour force participation.

Policy debates on women’s employment often focus on labour-market and public-sphere barriers – limited job availability, safety and mobility concerns, and mismatches between education, skills, and job opportunities. These constraints are indeed real and deserve attention. But ad-dressing them in isolation assumes that women can endlessly stretch their time to combine the existing domestic and care burden with paid work. For most women, most of the day is already earmarked for unpaid domestic and care work. Policies centred solely on employability or job creation ask women to squeeze in paid work into days that are already full, resulting in time poverty.

Unsurprisingly, many respond by opting out of the workforce or cluster-ing in home-based, informal, or part-time jobs that accommodate domestic responsibilities but offer limited security or advancement. When unpaid work remains unequally distributed within households, investments in skills, childcare, and employment generation struggle to trans-late into sustained workforce participation.

Sharing domestic work

The picture would change only when men share domestic responsibilities more equally; women would then gain the time and energy to effectively engage in paid work, amplifying the impact of labour-market interventions. But the issue is far more complex than what it appears to be.

This unequal allocation of domestic and care work does not emerge overnight. It is shaped early in life through gender socialisation. Girls spend their formative years learning household responsibilities, care giving, and emotional labour, while boys are more likely to invest time in market-oriented skills -uninterrupted study, sports, networking, and training. These early differences shape confidence, mobility, and expectations around work. By the time young adults enter the labour market, many women are already burdened with substantial unpaid household and care work that constrains their choices.

Change in culture

A life-cycle approach is therefore essential. It requires a fresh look at gendered division of labour and since it is learned early, it must also be addressed early. Life-skill education should explicitly include household and care work for both boys and girls, recognising cooking, cleaning, and care giving as essential skills for everyday life rather than women’s responsibilities alone. Embedding these skills within school curricula can help normalise men’s participation in domestic work long before adult-hood. Public investment must also extend beyond childcare to a broader care infrastructure to include even the elderly.

While schemes such as ‘Palna’ have strengthened crèche facilities, their reach remains too limited. As India’s population ages, need for elderly care will further intensify women’s unpaid care work burden unless it is addressed through expanded public and community-based services.

Importantly, this is not merely a cultural argument but an economic one. Countries that have successfully narrowed gender gaps in employment, particularly Scandinavian nations, had combined labour-market reforms with policies that actively encourage men’s engagement in care work through parental leave, workplace norms, and sustained public messaging that frames domestic responsibility as shared work. India’s own time-use data now provides the empirical foundation to pursue a similar, evidence-based conversation more honestly.

As India aspires to harness its demographic dividend and accelerate inclusive growth, it must confront a simple reality: half of its population -women – cannot join paid employment on equal terms with men unless unpaid domestic work is redistributed. Promoting men’s participation at home is neither radical nor symbolic. It is a pragmatic policy lever,one that recognizes housework and care as essential work and treats women’s time as finite and valuable. Unless the unequal distribution of unpaid work within households is addressed, India’s full economic potential cannot be unleashed.

The writer is an Associate Fellow at the National Data Innovation Centre (NDIC), NCAER. Views are personal.

Changes in the household expenditure basket in India during COVID-19

Background: The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc across countries, causing an unprecedented healthcare crisis and supply chain disruptions. Our paper focuses on how households coped and the role of expanded Indian government food subsidies in mitigating food insecurity.

Objective: We use panel data from two rounds of household surveys (2019 and 2021) to examine changes in per capita household expenditure and how these differed across occupation and income groups. We also discuss the role of in-kind assistance, extended during the pandemic, in smoothing food consumption.

Methods: We use fixed effects panel regression to estimate changes in per capita expenditure on various items in the household budget before and after the onset of the pandemic. We also estimate shifts in the composition of the household food basket between the two time periods.

Results: In the survey area, both per capita incomes and per capita household expenditure decreased, but the expenditure decrease was largely concentrated in discretionary items, leaving food consumption unchanged. The government policy of distributing practically free cereals, combined with household emphasis on protecting food expenditure, helped avert a substantial decline in food consumption and even led to a slight increase in dietary diversity.

Conclusions: The pre-existing social safety net in the form of a food distribution program helped cushion the impact of the pandemic-related income decline.

Contribution: Our examination of India’s expanded free food program during the pandemic contributes to the literature on the role of in-kind assistance during catastrophic emergencies.

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