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The Union Cabinet’s approval of the Small Hydro Power Development Scheme for FY 2026-27 to FY 2030-31 is a sensible intervention. With an outlay of ₹2,584.6 crore, including ₹2,532 crore for project implementation, the scheme aims to add 1,500 MW of capacity through projects of 1-25 MW. That focus matters. Small hydro power remains one of India’s most underused renewable resources, especially in hilly and North-Eastern states where the resource is concentrated but conventional grid expansion is costly and slow.

Small hydro power has long occupied an odd place in India’s renewable energy strategy. It lacks the scale and headline appeal of solar parks or the policy momentum of battery storage. Yet it offers something both solar and wind cannot always provide: firm power with relatively high plant load factors, long asset life, and lower intermittency. It is also well suited to remote regions where local generation matters more than national capacity numbers.

India’s assessed small hydro power potential is 21,133 MW across 7,133 sites. Only a fraction of that has been tapped. Small hydro accounts for just 2.6% of India’s renewable energy installed capacity, excluding large hydro. That tells its own story. The problem is not the absence of resource. It is the inability to convert resource into viable projects.

State-wise hydro gaps show the real constraint

The geography of small hydro power is uneven, and so is its development. The Himalayan states and the Western Ghats dominate the resource map because they have steep gradients, perennial rivers, and a longer history of hydro development. Even there, capacity addition has lagged far behind potential. Karnataka has used only 34% of its assessed small hydro potential, Himachal Pradesh 29%, Uttarakhand 14%, and Arunachal Pradesh just 7%.

These are not trivial gaps. They reflect the familiar obstacles of Indian infrastructure: difficult terrain, forest and land clearances, weak evacuation systems, long construction cycles, and high civil works costs. In remote regions, these problems compound each other. A project may be technically sound and still fail the test of bankability.

Some states with fewer topographical and climatic constraints have done better. Telangana has tapped 89% of its assessed potential, Haryana 68%, Gujarat 56%, while Odisha and Maharashtra have reached 49%. The contrast is instructive. Small hydro does not fail because the technology is weak. It stalls because execution capacity is uneven.

States hold the key to small hydro power

That is why the central scheme, while welcome, cannot by itself unlock the sector. Small hydro is site-specific in a way that solar and wind are not. It cannot be scaled through a generic national template. Water is a state subject. Clearances, local infrastructure, land access, and project coordination all depend on state governments. The economic gains from such projects, roads, local jobs, ancillary services, and electricity access, also accrue largely within the state. Yet the same states often remain the principal bottleneck.

The implication is clear. India does not need a uniform national push as much as it needs competent state-level execution. The Tamil Nadu government’s recent policy allowing private developers to generate power for self-consumption or third-party sale points to a more pragmatic route. Decentralised flexibility, not centralised ambition, is what this sector requires.

Financing small hydro power projects

That also explains why public finance will matter. In remote and high-risk geographies, private developers will not step in merely because the Centre has announced a scheme. The risk-return equation is often unattractive. Viability Gap Funding, concessional debt, and state-backed support for transmission and evacuation infrastructure will be necessary if private capital is to come in at all.

This is where policy usually turns vague. It should not. If the government wants 1,500 MW of credible addition, it must identify which risks the public sector will absorb and which risks the market can bear. Without that division, the scheme risks producing announcements rather than assets.

Climate risks could reshape hydro economics

There is another complication. Climate change is altering the basic assumptions on which hydro projects are designed. Erratic rainfall, glacial melt, higher sedimentation, flashier river flows, and more frequent landslides are raising both engineering and financing risks, particularly in the Himalayan belt. Small hydro power may be cleaner than large hydro in its footprint, but it is not insulated from hydrological instability.

That makes climate resilience central to project design, not an afterthought. Seasonal water variability already affects generation consistency. In future, the challenge will be sharper. Projects will need more conservative design standards, stronger safety margins, and a more realistic assessment of operating risks.

Renewable models deserve policy support

This is also why hybridisation deserves more attention. Pairing small hydro power with solar or storage can improve supply stability and reduce dependence on seasonal water flows. India has moved too slowly on such models, though the logic is strong. Where hydro assets can provide balancing support to variable renewables, the system value rises well beyond the installed capacity number.

Examples from larger hydro-storage settings show the direction. The question is whether policy can adapt that logic to smaller, decentralised contexts. If it can, small hydro may yet find a viable role in India’s renewable mix, not as a mass solution, but as a strategic one.

The Cabinet’s new scheme is therefore best seen as an enabling step, not a breakthrough. India’s small hydro future will depend less on budgetary announcements from New Delhi than on whether states can clear projects faster, build evacuation links, share risks intelligently, and plan for a harsher climate. The resource exists. What is missing is administrative capacity where it matters most.

Chetana Chaudhuri is a Fellow, and Ujala Kumari a consultant at NCAER, New Delhi. Views are personal.

Urbanisation, migration, and changing aspirations often leave older adults to navigate their later years with greater independence but also, at times, greater isolation.

India stands at a quiet but significant turning point in how it understands ageing. For generations, the joint family system served as the backbone of elderly care, offering not just physical support but also emotional security and a sense of belonging. Today, however, that structure is steadily evolving. Urbanisation, migration, and changing aspirations have reshaped family life, often leaving older adults to navigate their later years with greater independence but also, at times, greater isolation.

This transition has not gone unnoticed. Recent policy initiatives signal a growing recognition that the well-being of senior citizens must be treated as a national priority.

The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment is implementing an umbrella scheme, namely Atal Vayo Abhyudaya Yojana (AVYAY). Under AVYAY and its Integrated Programme for Senior Citizens, the government currently supports hundreds of facilities aimed at providing shelter, healthcare, and social engagement for elderly citizens. Complementing these efforts, the Union Budget 2026-27 announced a plan to train 1.5 lakh caregivers within a year through programmes aligned with the National Skills Qualifications Framework (NSQF). Such initiatives reflect a growing recognition that as India’s elderly population expands, organised systems of caregiving and assisted living will become increasingly important.

Yet, policy alone cannot address the deeper social realities of ageing. Evidence increasingly shows that a significant proportion of elderly individuals now live either alone or only with their spouse. While such arrangements may offer autonomy, they can also lead to loneliness, reduced social interaction, and limited access to immediate care during emergencies. In this context, the question is how society must respond to ensure dignity and well-being in old age.

This is where old age homes and assisted living facilities enter the conversation, often reluctantly. In India, these institutions continue to carry a heavy social stigma, commonly associated with abandonment or familial failure. However, this perception deserves careful re-examination. When thoughtfully designed, such spaces can provide community, companionship, and a renewed sense of purpose.

Ageing is not merely a medical condition – it is a social experience. For many elderly individuals, the absence of daily interaction can be as challenging as any physical ailment. In contrast, well-run residential facilities create vibrant social environments with group activities, cultural events, and shared routines. Whether it is participating in yoga sessions, attending film screenings, or engaging in conversations with peers, these interactions play a crucial role in maintaining emotional and psychological well-being.

Moreover, structured living can significantly enhance the quality of life. Regular meals, assistance with daily tasks, and access to healthcare services provide a sense of stability that is often difficult to achieve when living alone. Such environments can also encourage continued engagement with society.

From shame to dignity

This perspective invites a broader rethinking of ageing itself. Rather than viewing the elderly as dependents, it is possible to see them as a social dividend – a reservoir of experience, knowledge, and wisdom. Interactions between older adults and younger generations, through community programmes or school visits, can strengthen social bonds, promote mutual understanding and turn ageing into a period of continued participation rather than withdrawal.

For this vision to take root, a dual transformation is required – both in infrastructure and in mindset. Institutional care must evolve beyond basic shelter to become holistic centres that integrate healthcare, recreation, and social engagement. At the same time, the care economy needs sustained investment in trained professionals, fair wages, and supportive working conditions.

Equally important is the need to shift public perception. Choosing to live in an aged care facility should not be seen as a sign of neglect, but as one of many legitimate ways to ensure comfort and companionship. Just as younger generations seek independence in their living arrangements, older individuals should also have the freedom to choose environments that best support their needs.

India’s demographic journey makes this conversation urgent. As the population ages, the country must expand its understanding of social security to include not only financial support but also emotional and community-based care. Old age homes, when reimagined, can become an integral part of this framework – spaces where dignity is preserved, relationships are nurtured, and life continues with meaning.

Moving from shame to dignity is not just about redefining institutions; it is about redefining values. It requires acknowledging that the final years of life deserve the same care, respect, and fulfilment as every other stage. In doing so, India has the opportunity to transform ageing from a narrative of decline into one of continued connection and grace.

Palash is a fellow, and Madhura is a consultant at the National Council of Applied Economic Research, NCAER, New Delhi. Views are personal.

Its role in rural development goes beyond crop output benefits to enhancing infrastructure, service delivery, local economic activity

Summary

• Watershed development is emerging as a crucial strategy for India’s rural climate resilience.
• It enhances soil moisture and groundwater recharge, and also supports overal rural transformation.
• Increased public investment and community participation in watershed projects can boost rural economies, reduce migration.

India’s rural economy continues to be shaped by the uncertainties of water availability. While large irrigation projects often dominate public discourse, nearly 52 per cent of the country’s gross cropped area remains rain-fed, accounting for a disproportionately high share of agrarian risk and climate vulnerability.

In this context, watershed development — frequently viewed as a technical soil-conservation programme — deserves renewed attention as a central pillar of India’s strategy for sustainable rural growth.

A watershed is a natural hydrological unit where rainfall drains to a common outlet such as a stream or river. Development interventions within such units aim to conserve rainwater, improve soil moisture, enhance groundwater recharge and restore degraded land.

India’s watershed initiatives, now implemented under the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana–Watershed Development Component (PMKSY-WDC), seek to address land degradation and water stress while strengthening farm livelihoods.

The scale of the challenge is substantial. Official estimates indicate that over 96 million hectares of land in India face degradation, much of it concentrated in semi-arid and rainfed regions. At the same time, groundwater, which supports nearly two-thirds of irrigation, is being extracted faster than it is replenished in several states. Climate change is likely to intensify rainfall variability, making localised water conservation and recharge strategies increasingly critical.

Public investment in watershed development has also expanded in recent years, reflecting its growing policy salience. Under PMKSY, the Watershed Development Component has received sustained budgetary support from the Union government, complemented by state-level funding and convergence with programmes such as the rural employment guarantee scheme.

In recent years, central allocations for watershed and rain-fed area development have broadly ranged between Rs 2,000 crore and Rs 3,000 crore annually, enabling treatment of large tracts of degraded land and creation of durable water-harvesting structures. Yet, the developmental returns on such investments depend as much on institutional capacity and convergence planning as on the size of budgetary outlays.

Empirical evidence from watershed projects across states suggests that well-designed interventions can significantly improve agricultural performance. Structures such as check dams, farm ponds, contour bunds and percolation tanks have been associated with rises in groundwater levels, expansion of irrigated area and increases in cropping intensity often ranging from 10-20 percentage points. Such improvements allow farmers to diversify into horticulture, pulses and other higher-value crops, thereby stabilising farm incomes.

Several states illustrate how effective watershed management can reshape local economies. In parts of Maharashtra’s semi-arid districts, watershed initiatives have contributed to increased groundwater recharge and expansion of multi-cropping. Karnataka and Telangana have also demonstrated how community participation and convergence with employment programmes can support restoration of degraded lands and improvement in livestock productivity. These experiences underline the importance of integrating technical interventions with local institutional support.

The economic impact of watershed development extends beyond crop output. Improved water availability often stimulates investments in livestock, agro-processing and small rural enterprises. Field-level assessments indicate that villages benefiting from enhanced irrigation and natural resource management frequently experience reduced seasonal migration, as households gain more stable income opportunities. Such indirect and intangible benefits remain under-documented but are central to understanding the broader role of water management in rural transformation.

Watershed programmes also interact closely with rural infrastructure development. Increased water security encourages the creation of farm-level assets, minor irrigation channels and storage facilities. When combined with decentralised planning and fiscal transfers to local governments, including Finance Commission grants to Panchayats, these interventions can improve service delivery and strengthen local economic activity. This highlights the critical role of grassroots institutions in sustaining the gains from watershed investments.

Despite these successes, programme performance has been uneven across regions. One key limitation is the continued reliance on physical indicators such as hectares treated or number of structures constructed to measure progress. A shift towards outcome-based evaluation, incorporating indicators such as productivity growth, groundwater sustainability, livelihood diversification and social development, would enable more informed policy decisions.

Capacity building remains equally important. Implementation involves multiple stakeholders, including technical agencies, community organisations and local governments. Training initiatives under PMKSY-WDC 2.0 must therefore move beyond engineering guidelines to include participatory planning, climate-adaptive agriculture and monitoring of socio-economic impacts. Creating a national pool of trained resource persons and strengthening district-level institutions can significantly improve programme effectiveness.

As climate risks intensify, the strategic relevance of watershed development is likely to increase. By improving soil moisture retention and groundwater recharge, such interventions enhance the resilience of rural production systems against droughts and erratic rainfall. From a public finance perspective, investments in watershed management represent a cost-effective pathway for climate adaptation, with benefits that extend across agriculture, employment and ecological sustainability.

India’s experience demonstrates that managing water at the micro-catchment level can generate macro-economic dividends. Watershed development is not merely about conserving soil and water; it is about enabling rural regions to transition towards more diversified, productive and resilient growth pathways. With stronger institutional convergence and evidence-based monitoring, it can become one of the country’s most impactful instruments for inclusive development in an era of climate uncertainty.

Saurabh Bandyopadhyay is a senior fellow and Laxmi Joshi a fellow at the National Council of Applied Economic Research. Views expressed are the authors’ own and don’t necessarily reflect those of Down To Earth.

Women may enter the workforce in large numbers, but evidence from multiple sectors shows that participation does not automatically translate into leadership or economic power.

Cooking, caregiving, grooming, sewing, teaching. These are still seen as “women’s work” across societies. After all, women do these tasks routinely within households and communities, often without pay or recognition. Yet when the same activities become organised industries or profitable professions, it’s men who tend to dominate positions of authority, prestige and reward.

This paradox reflects a deeper pattern in labour markets. When work is informal, unpaid, or low-status, women are heavily represented. But when it becomes professionalised and profitable, men often occupy leadership roles. In most households, for instance, cooking remains primarily a woman’s responsibility. But in professional kitchens like restaurants or  hotels, the most prestigious positions such as executive chefs are overwhelmingly held by men.

The activity remains the same, but its social and economic value changes once it becomes a profession. This pattern repeats itself across multiple sectors of the economy.

The hierarchy within ‘women’s work’

Even in occupations traditionally associated with women, a clear hierarchy emerges once income, authority and prestige enter the picture.

Consider the beauty and grooming industry, often viewed as a women-dominated sector. A 2024  study by Edge Empower, a diversity and inclusion firm, analysed 25 major public beauty companies and found that women comprised 69 per cent of the overall workforce and 63 per cent of junior management roles. But only 36 per cent of senior management positions were held by women. Women dominate the service labour, but men disproportionately run the business.

It’s a similar story in labour-intensive manufacturing. In Bangladesh’s garment sector, women account for around 80 per cent of production-line workers, making the industry one of the largest sources of wage employment for women. However, a World Bank working paper shows that women occupy only about 5 per cent of managerial roles such as line supervisors or factory managers.

Education provides another example. Teaching young children is widely seen as a feminised profession. Data from UDISE+ 2024-25 shows that women constitute about 54 per cent of school teachers overall in India. At the foundational stage, they account for nearly 96 per cent. However, as one moves up the educational hierarchy, the gender balance shifts. At the secondary level, women’s share drops to about 46 per cent.

The gap becomes even more pronounced in higher education. According to the All-India Survey of Higher Education (AISHE) 2021-22, women constitute around 43 per cent of faculty members, but only about 30 per cent of professors, the highest academic rank. Across sectors, from beauty services to manufacturing and education, the divide between who performs the work and who holds authority is difficult to miss.

Skilling alone will not close the gap

These patterns have important implications for policy, especially at a time when India is seeking to harness its demographic dividend.

In recent years, governments have placed strong emphasis on skill development and employability programmes. Initiatives under the national skill missions aim to train millions of young people and bring more women into the labour market. These efforts are necessary and welcome. But skilling alone will not solve the deeper structural problem. Women may receive training and enter the workforce in large numbers, but the evidence from multiple sectors cited earlier shows that participation does not automatically translate into leadership, ownership or economic power. The challenge is not merely about entry into the workforce, but about who is allowed to rise up.

Several structural barriers contribute to this gap. Women shoulder a disproportionate share of unpaid care work, limiting their time for career advancement. Access to credit, capital and business networks also remains unequal. Professional advancement often depends on mentorship, mobility, and institutional support — areas where women frequently face disadvantages.

If these structural constraints remain unaddressed, skill development programmes may unintentionally reproduce existing hierarchies. Women may enter industries at the lowest tiers, while leadership and ownership gradually become male-dominated as sectors expand and become more profitable. For India to truly benefit from its demographic dividend, policy must therefore go beyond increasing women’s participation in the workforce.

Skill development programmes must be accompanied by measures that enable women to move up the value chain. This includes expanding childcare infrastructure, improving women’s access to credit and entrepreneurship opportunities, ensuring that women have equal opportunities to be promoted to supervisory and leadership positions, and strengthening the representation of women in managerial and decision-making roles. Otherwise, the paradox will continue to repeat itself across sectors: women will perform much of the labour that sustains both households and industries, while authority, recognition and profits stay concentrated with men.

India’s demographic dividend will not be realised simply by training more women. It will depend on ensuring that when ‘women’s work’ becomes a profession, women are not pushed to its margins but remain at its centre.

Nijara Deka is a Fellow and Sameeha Jameel a Research Analyst at the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER). Views are personal.