Capital crunch stifles entrepreneurs in low-income economies

The promise of markets and the reality of constraints. 

 

In a vulnerable low-income country, what an entrepreneur typically lacks is not ideas, ability or demand – but financing. Local banks are often undercapitalised, ill-prepared or unwilling to take on risks and capital markets, where they exist, are thin, shallow or inaccessible. The absence of reliable, scalable financing channels thus continues to constrain the entry and growth of new firms and start-ups limiting their economic role to drive structural transformation.

The World Bank’s recent report, ‘Financing Firm Growth: The Role of Capital Markets in Low- and Middle-Income Countries’, sheds light on the scale of this challenge. Drawing on firm-level data from over 100 countries, the report finds that when firms raise capital through markets, their physical investment rises by 8-16% in the following year. Markets, it argues, are not substitutes for banks – they complement them by freeing up credit for smaller borrowers and supporting longer-term investment behaviour.

This message is timely. As concessional finance declines, vulnerabilities mount and aid priorities shift, vulnerable low-income countries must increasingly rely on domestic sources of funding. Efficient capital markets are not a luxury – they are foundational infrastructure for economic growth. Critically, the shift has to be for firms and entrepreneurs – not governments – to borrow to invest, scale and create jobs.

Scope and limits of the evidence

While the report appropriately limits itself to assessing firm-level effects, its findings raise important questions about institutional feasibility. In many vulnerable low-income economies, the legal, supervisory and macroeconomic preconditions required for capital markets to function remain weak or missing. The challenge is not in demonstrating the benefits of markets, but in understanding how such markets might emerge and endure.

The report’s methodology provides valuable cross-country evidence. Yet the analysis could have examined variation across country contexts further, particularly those where markets are still nascent.

Missing institutional architecture

Will capital markets ever become a reality in vulnerable low-income countries? And if not, then what are the alternatives?

After all, the multilateral technical market building efforts from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have been active for several decades. The policy frameworks of these vulnerable low-income economies have placed financial systems and capital markets as a reform priority. Yet, these countries are far from meeting their day-to-day financing needs from the local markets.

Could one avenue lie in regional approaches towards capital markets? For small economies, developing national capital markets may be economically inefficient. Regional platforms, such as the West African Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, allow participating countries to pool listings, liquidity and infrastructure. They offer scale that no individual country could achieve alone. However, such arrangements would still depend on legal harmonisation, supervisory coordination and sustained macroeconomic discipline – preconditions that cannot be assumed.

A related issue is prioritisation. The World Bank’s report does not differentiate among countries based on structural vulnerability, nor does it tailor its insights accordingly. Yet such distinctions matter. The United Nations identifies 46 least developed countries, the World Bank’s International Development Association lists 75 recipients of concessional finance and the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust supports 69 low-income economies. These classifications, though widely used in development finance, are rarely employed to shape capital market and broader financial sector reform or to calibrate expectations – despite vast differences in institutional and fiscal capacity.

Learning from practice, not just principle

Some are attempting to bridge the gap between evidence and implementation. The African Development Bank, through its Capital Markets Development Trust Fund, has provided tailored legal reform and technical support in over a dozen vulnerable countries. OMFIF’s Absa Africa Financial Markets Index has also grown into a useful regional benchmark, tracking progress in regulatory effectiveness, settlement infrastructure and investor participation. The IMF and World Bank continue to assist countries who wish to implement market development and macroeconomic stabilisation strategies.

Private-sector contributions, by contrast, have been more limited. While some international consulting firms have produced capital market scorecards and diagnostics, many of these rely on assumptions of macroeconomic stability and institutional maturity – conditions often absent in vulnerable economies. These efforts also tend to understate the role of political economy constraints and the hybrid structures through which finance actually flows.

Most documented case studies of success in capital market development focus on upper-middle-income countries. The experiences of smaller and more vulnerable economies – where reforms have been incomplete or politically constrained – remain underexplored. These cases may not yield clean narratives, but they better reflect the institutional realities many countries face. They also suggest the need for more creative, non-traditional policy approaches.

Beyond markets

The international community must move beyond blueprint-based thinking. Capital market development is not a linear process. Political volatility, external shocks and capacity gaps frequently disrupt reform efforts. In such environments, success depends less on ideal models and more on adaptive strategies – ones that allow countries to experiment, iterate and ‘fail forward’ while building institutional confidence over time.

In the near term, policy-makers in vulnerable economies may need to prioritise alternative financial architectures. Public development banks could anchor long-term finance; regional liquidity facilities could underwrite infrastructure investment; and mobile financial ecosystems could broaden access for smaller firms. In many cases, reinforcing informal or semi-formal channels may offer greater development impact than prematurely attempting to engineer deep capital markets.

Ultimately, the hardest policy questions lie not in reaffirming the value of capital markets, but in charting viable, politically and institutionally grounded pathways towards them. For vulnerable low-income economies, where capital market emergence remains uncertain, the priority must be not just vision – but realism.

Udaibir Das is a visiting professor at the National Council of Applied Economic Research, senior non-resident adviser at the Bank of England, senior adviser of the International Forum for Sovereign Wealth Funds, and distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation America. He was previously at the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the Reserve Bank of India.

Unmasking Climate Change Denial

Despite the visible reality of climate change, many professional “climate deniers” persist in spreading misinformation. Let’s contrast several common myths with the scientific reality. One pervasive myth claims that global warming is a hoax and there is no climate change. Yet, the surface of the Earth, including the atmosphere, oceans, and land, is warming rapidly, accompanied by numerous changes in the climate. In India, average temperatures have risen by around 0.7 degrees Celsius between 1901 and 2018, leading to more intense heatwaves and changing monsoon patterns, which affect millions of people.

Another myth argues that CO2 is not the cause of climate change. True, the climate has experienced warming periods before, but each instance was driven by excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, such as CO2, methane, and sulfur dioxide. Periods like the Eocene, with very high CO2 levels, saw landscapes evolve over millions of years, with oceans and forests gradually absorbing these gases to maintain equilibrium. However, sudden spikes in CO2 from events like volcanic eruptions led to devastation. The end-Permian event, which wiped out over 90% of known species, mirrors the warming and ocean acidity trends we see today, but this time, the CO2 increase stems from human activities, mainly fossil fuel burning. In India, CO2 emissions have grown from 1.2 billion tonnes in 1990 to 2.6 billion tonnes in 2019, largely due to industrial growth and increased energy consumption.

A third myth downplays the significance of a 2- or 3-degree Celsius increase in temperature, suggesting that because we cope with larger daily and seasonal temperature variations, this should be manageable. However, climate-related impacts are often tied to extreme events, not average climate conditions. Small changes in average temperatures can lead to significant increases in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. In India, even a 2-degree Celsius rise in temperature could result in severe heatwaves, reducing crop yields by up to 25 per cent and threatening food security for millions of people.

Some sceptics argue that cutting greenhouse gas emissions won’t significantly affect the climate by 2020 or even 2030, so there is no point in trying. But this is the critical decade for taking effective action to reduce emissions. Immediate steps are essential to mitigate long-term damage and ensure a livable future. In India, renewable energy capacity has increased significantly, from 39 gigawatts in 2015 to over 136 gigawatts in 2021, showing that proactive measures can make a substantial difference.

Another common myth is that climate change is just natural variability, akin to the Earth’s historical cold and warm cycles. However, evidence from basic physics to climate system observations strongly indicates that human activities, particularly the emission of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels, are the main drivers of the warming observed since the mid-20th century. In India, the frequency of extreme weather events such as floods, cyclones, and droughts has increased significantly, affecting millions of lives and causing billions of dollars in damages annually.

The reality of climate change poses the most fundamental threat facing our planet. We must unite as a global collective to demand major action now, as our very survival depends on it. The evidence and long-term analysis of the drivers of climate change clearly show the inevitable fate of our planet if we remain passive. While the issues surrounding climate change can be complex and overwhelming, immediate action is imperative. This is not a localized problem but a global crisis.

The Pentagon has identified climate change as a national security issue, highlighting the urgency of the matter. A staggering 97 per cent of scientists agree that climate change is real and accelerated by human activity. We are on the brink of the largest mass extinction since the disappearance of the dinosaurs, an event that has only occurred five times in the last 500 million years. By 2100, one in six species could go extinct if we do not take action now.

This narrative is not merely a description of long-term climatic trends but a call to understand the dynamics and variations of these changes. Further studies focused on the cause-and-effect relationships are crucial for accurately predicting climate change. Only with such understanding can we hope to address this global challenge effectively.

Our time for complacency has passed. Our survival hinges on immediate, sustained action to combat climate change. The future of our planet and generations to come depends on our response to this urgent crisis. Let’s rise to the challenge and secure a livable future for all.

Dr Souryabrata Mohapatra, Asst Prof IIT Jodhpur, Amit Mitra, Research Associate at NCAER. Views are personal.

Monthly Economic Review: March 2025

In the Review, we summarise the economic and policy developments in India; monitor global developments of relevance to India; and showcase the pulse of the economy through an analysis of high-frequency indicators and the heat map.

Click here for previous issues.

In India, labour needs as much focus as capital

An agile and dynamic policy framework that focuses on creating a workforce for the future to advance the agenda of Viksit Bharat is critical.

Since 2017-18, the working-age population of India has increased by about 9 crore, while formal sector jobs rose by 6 crore — a deficit of 50 lakh jobs annually. Most of the recent increase in employment has come either from self-employment in rural areas or from informal services. Hence, both the quality and the quantity of work opportunities are under strain with a rising working-age population.

The challenge of expanding work opportunities in the formal sector becomes even more daunting in the face of rapid technological progress. Data shows a persistent and steady decline in the labour intensity of production technology across sectors.

This deepening of the capital intensity of the production process, including in labour-intensive manufacturing and services industries, is likely to hasten with the advent of AI.

But why is the capital intensity of production rising in a labour-abundant economy? There can be two factors at play — one, demand-side factors, which make the adoption of capital-intensive techniques imperative for increasing productivity and value added at low cost, and two, supply-side factors, which impinge on the availability of complementary quality or skilled labour.

If the relative cost of capital or machinery falls, it incentivises producers to invest in more capital-intensive technology, even without any gains in productivity. Value added has increased the most in the services sector, which is reflected in the rising contribution of the services sector to GVA (Gross Value Added) and to GDP.

However, the manufacturing sector’s contribution has been stagnant while agriculture’s contribution to GDP has declined. Although real wages have not risen significantly, the price of capital or new machine-based technology is falling rapidly with technological progress worldwide. At the same time, less than 10 per cent of our labour force has any formal technical or vocational training and evidence suggests that the majority of our educated youth do not possess skills that make them employment ready.

With the advent of new technologies that favour particular skills, there is likely to be devaluation or destruction of tasks that become redundant. This “skill-biased technological change” lowers the demand for labour by firms as they shift towards more productive and relatively cheaper machine-based technologies. It is, therefore, imperative to continuously equip and re-equip our labour force with skills that complement new technology and machinery. Given this scenario, what are the policies that need to be adopted to incentivise hiring more labour in the formal sector?

The central government has been following two, somewhat parallel, tracks to address the jobs deficit: On the one hand, it aims to increase production capacity, for instance through the PLI scheme, and on the other, incentivise the private sector to hire more labour while also skilling them, through the ELI and other internship programmes.

The current structure of the PLI scheme is primarily focused on expanding production of high-value products with backward linkages, which require high-skilled, specialised labour, and is relatively less focused on low- and middle-skilled labour-intensive sectors. Specifically, over 50 per cent of the PLI budget is allocated for large-scale electronics, IT hardware and drone manufacturing. However, the highest number of jobs under the scheme has been created in the food processing and pharmaceutical industries. Hence, there is a mismatch between the weight of the budgetary allocation and the potential for employment creation. The emphasis on high-end products is also constrained by the lack of adequate supply of labour with complementary skills, which could further stymie creation of new jobs. The majority of our current labour force possesses low or medium skills.

The ELI scheme, on the other hand, intends to create jobs in the formal sector, effectively through government cash transfers via the EPFO, and in relatively labour-intensive sectors, by bearing some of the risk of hiring untrained labour by private firms. While this policy does reduce the cost of labour by shifting (the initial) burden on to the government, the period of the subsidy or transfers is short (about two to three years). It is yet to be seen whether the scheme will be successful in creating durable employment. More importantly, data would be needed to follow interns over time to evaluate whether the scheme leads to sustainable skilling. It is, therefore, an open question how the ELI scheme can address the fundamental issue of encouraging employers to invest in not just initial skilling but also upskilling the workforce to complement new technologies.

Simply put, policymakers should consider linking the production and labour skilling strategies to create a comprehensive and cohesive agenda to not only expand production capacity but also ensure a pipeline of workers with requisite, complementary skills in these sectors. Such an approach would address both the demand- and supply-side factors that impinge on job creation, while also inducing the structural transformation of the economy towards high-value manufacturing.

Currently, each ministry focuses on utilisation of its own PLI budget with little (if any) coordination with the ministries of labour and skilling to map where the current and (expected) future supply of (skilled) labour will come from. The current structure of ELI incentives could also be amended from flat to graded, that is, transfers would increase with each level of skills that is certified to support both on-the-job training and upgrading of skills. The ELI scheme’s focus could also move further back into the skill supply chain — to re-haul and reward training institutes and programmes (such as ITIs) based on employment and earnings outcomes through skills that are linked to the projected future demand.

At the same time, we cannot ignore the long-standing issue of loosening our labour regulations that artificially inflate the cost of labour and encourage the adoption of capital intensive technologies. The onus of adopting flexible labour policies, however, lies with the state governments.

An agile and dynamic policy framework that focuses on creating a workforce for the future to advance the agenda of Viksit Bharat is critical. As we collectively move up the production value chain, we must simultaneously invest in both the quantity and the quality of our present and future workforce.

The writer is professor of Economics at the ISI (Delhi) and visiting professor at NCAER. Views are personal.

NCAER News: March 2025

NCAER News is a monthly newsletter where you can learn about NCAER’s research outputs, its latest events, and offerings.

    Get updates from NCAER