Technological advancement and employment changes: Recent trends in India

What is the impact of rapid technological advancements on employment in the Indian economy? In this post, Kathuria and Dev analyse ‘Consumer Pyramids Household Survey’ data to explore this question. They note a consistent decline in the share of low-skilled workers across sectors, along with reduced employment prospects, particularly in the post-Covid-19 era. They advocate for training these workers – especially women – so that they can transition into higher-skill, higher-paying jobs.

In the past few decades – particularly in the post-Covid-19 period – the world has witnessed rapid technological advancements that have revolutionised industries and labour markets. The Fourth Industrial Revolution (‘Industry 4.0’), characterised by artificial intelligence (AI), automation, and the Internet of Things (IoT), is redefining how we work. India, a key player in the global economy, is no exception to this trend. In this scenario, it is critical to assess the impact of technological progress on employment trends in the country.

In our new research (Kathuria and Dev 2024), we analyse recent trends in technological advancements and employment shifts in the Indian economy. Using data from the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey (CPHS) by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), we examine developments over the past five years, starting from 2019. Our study reveals two key trends: (i) a consistent decline in the share of low-skilled workers across all sectors (primary (agriculture), secondary (manufacturing), and tertiary (services)), and (ii) an increase in skill intensity, albeit at varying rates across sectors, is observed, wherein low-skilled workers are gradually being replaced by their more skilled counterparts.

No escape from skilling

The threat of technological displacement looms large over India’s labour market. The pandemic has accelerated automation, prompting many industries to adopt digital tools that reduce their reliance on human labour. While this transition has benefited skilled workers, our research reveals a troubling reality for low-skilled labourers: while automation increases demand for complementary skills, it also brings the risk of job displacement. Without significant intervention, low-skilled workers are likely to be left behind. As businesses adapted to new technologies and remote work arrangements during the Covid-19 pandemic, the decline in the share of low-skilled workers accelerated. Low-skilled workers bore the brunt of this disruption across all sectors – primary, secondary, and tertiary – though at varying rates.

For India, the ability to work with technology is more crucial than the fear of job replacement. In other words, job polarisation, a characteristic of developed and aging economies, has not yet fully manifested in Indian data. However, low-skilled workers are likely to face greater long-term challenges due to growth and the structural transformation of the economy, which is expected to see a further decline in the share of the primary sector.

This shift signifies a broader transformation in India’s employment landscape: skill is becoming the most valuable asset, even in sectors once havens for the unskilled – Figure 1 below shows the changing trend in the skill composition of workers across the three sectors. In agriculture, the share of low-skilled workers declined while medium-skilled workers filled the gap. There was also a notable increase in the employment of medium-skilled and skilled workers in the secondary and tertiary sectors. The tertiary industries saw the highest growth in professional jobs, with over 65% of their workforce now consisting of qualified workers.

Figure 1. Workers’ skill composition across sectors

Source: Authors’ calculations based on CPHS-CMIE data.

India’s structural transformation has been unique. Unlike the East Asian economies, which experienced rapid industrialisation before transitioning to services, India leapfrogged directly to a service-led economy. While this has spurred economic growth, it has created a jobs paradox of high growth in GDP (gross domestic product) but insufficient growth in productive, formal employment opportunities. According to statistics, 90% of Indian workers are in informal jobs, with many low-skilled individuals stuck in precarious employment that offers little security or upward mobility.

Of late, the demand for skilled workers has risen significantly. The share of skilled and specialist workers has steadily grown across the secondary and tertiary sectors. Our study points out that industries like IT (information technology), financial services, and healthcare have seen a surge in the employment of highly educated workers, those with at least a 12th-grade education or a university degree. Tertiary industries, which include booming sectors like e-commerce, digital media, and online education, have embraced this trend. Over 65% of the workforce in the services sector now consists of skilled and specialist employees. As more industries adopt AI and automation, workers with critical thinking, creativity, and problem-solving skills are becoming increasingly valuable.

No job polarisation and gender disparities

Notably, while India is witnessing a rise in skilled labour demand, it has not followed the job-polarisation trajectory of many developed countries. In Western economies, the disappearance of middle-skill jobs has led to a ‘hollowing out’ of the labour market, where only high- and low-skill jobs remain. In contrast, India’s middle-skill segment is growing, reflecting a more balanced evolution of its labour market. There has been an overall upskilling of the labour market.

While employment opportunities have improved for skilled women, gender disparities in employment remain significant. For low-skilled women, the chances of securing employment have diminished dramatically, falling by nearly 50% since 2019. Given the prevailing gender inequalities and the evolving skill requirements in the labour market, low-skilled women face disproportionately greater challenges. These challenges arise both from gender-biased labour market practices and from a lack of the necessary skill set. Our findings indicate that these women are among the most adversely affected groups in the context of these shifts.

However, there is a silver lining. Skilled women are beginning to gain traction in the labour market. Industries like healthcare, education, and digital services provide more opportunities for women with higher education. The rise of remote work and flexible employment options, catalysed by the pandemic, could also boost female workforce participation in the coming years.

A ray of hope: The case for skilling India

Despite the challenges, the findings offer hope. India stands at a crossroads. As the country’s economy continues to grow, it must confront the challenges posed by rapid technological advancement. While the rise of AI and automation presents opportunities for growth and innovation, it also threatens to exacerbate inequality and push low-skilled workers further into the margins. The workers who upgrade their skills have a better chance of thriving in a technology-driven economy. As more sectors embrace AI and automation, the need for complementary human skills will grow. For example, while AI can handle repetitive tasks, it still requires skilled human workers to interpret data, solve complex problems, and design new systems.

There is a need for policy interventions to address the skills gap. Targeted programmes that provide low-skilled workers the training they need to move into higher-skill, higher-paying jobs could mitigate the skill gap. This is particularly crucial for women, who could benefit from skilling initiatives designed to help them enter sectors where they have traditionally been underrepresented.

The views expressed in this post are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of their organisations or of the I4I Editorial Board

Five Implications of “America First” for the Global South

The global economic and financial order stands at the precipice of a seismic shift. Within just 24 hours of the new U.S. administration taking office, the early outlines of its vision are already signaling profound changes in how the United States engages with the world. Warnings about currency manipulation, coupled with proposals to create a Department of External Revenue, hint at a trajectory that could redefine international trade and finance. Policies aimed at reshoring manufacturing, imposing steep tariffs, and realigning energy and technology priorities have sent ripples — if not outright shockwaves — through global financial markets.

For emerging markets and developing economies, the fallout could demand a fundamental recalibration of trade strategies, financing models, and approaches to sovereign debt management and development aid. The longstanding reliance on multilateral frameworks and the global financial safety net may no longer be a given. These nations could find themselves navigating these policy shifts independently, analyzing their impact and formulating responses in an environment marked by heightened uncertainty.

When viewed through the lens of financial channels — capital flows, exchange rates, and investment patterns — the implications of the U.S. policy reset for the Global South become clear. These nations are poised to experience the brunt of these changes through five critical financial pathways.

One headline policy is the imposition of a 25% tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico starting February 1, 2025. Proposals for broader tariffs potentially target BRICS nations, disrupting global trade flows and directly affecting developing economies. Higher tariffs can reduce trade surpluses for export-heavy BRICS nations like China and India, potentially causing a decline in foreign exchange reserves or an increase in debt financing. For developing countries reliant on BRICS supply chains, this may reduce trade finance opportunities and cross-border lending. The tariffs are expected to strengthen the U.S. dollar, putting downward pressure on the currencies of the developing world. This could exacerbate debt vulnerabilities for nations with sizeable dollar-denominated debt burdens, common among Global South economies. Markets typically react to protectionist measures with increased risk aversion, leading to capital outflows from emerging markets as investors seek the safety of U.S. assets, pushing up borrowing costs for developing nations.

Second, the administration’s energy policies, including dismantling electric vehicle mandates and boosting fossil fuel industries, could have mixed consequences for BRICS and resource-dependent economies. Russia and Brazil, as significant oil and gas exporters, might see a short-term boost in demand. However, the global transition toward green finance could be undermined, creating uncertainty in renewable energy investments in emerging markets. Energy-exporting nations in the Global South may face declining valuations of their sovereign-owned funds if the emphasis on fossil fuels deters investments in sustainable infrastructure, affecting fiscal stability.

Third, the administration’s ban on items with connected software from “countries of concern,” including China, marks a significant shift in U.S.-China technological relations. Reduced technological collaboration may deter U.S. venture capital and private equity investments in emerging markets tied to Chinese technology supply chains, slowing the growth of tech startups in countries like India and South Africa. The BRICS bloc might seek to strengthen intra-regional financial cooperation to offset these restrictions, with initiatives like cross-border payments in local currencies or BRICS development bank funding for tech projects gaining momentum. Influenced by U.S. policy signals, private investors may scale back commitments to climate-related investments in developing economies, widening the gap in climate finance. Countries like China and India may push harder for regional initiatives, such as climate resilience funds, to mobilize resources. However, limited fiscal space in Global South countries could constrain their ability to catalyze private-sector investment.

Fourth, emerging markets and BRICS nations often depend on access to international financial markets to fund development. Protectionist measures, combined with potential Federal Reserve tightening, could pose risks. Rising interest rates in the U.S. and a stronger dollar will increase debt-servicing costs for countries with significant external debt, intensifying the risk of sovereign debt crises, especially in lower-income Global South countries. Investor concerns over geopolitical tensions could reduce access to U.S. capital markets, pushing BRICS nations to issue bonds in local currencies or explore alternatives like green bonds in Asian and Middle Eastern markets.

And fifth, the retreat from multilateralism under the “America First” doctrine could accelerate BRICS nations’ efforts to reshape the global financial architecture. BRICS might enhance the role of the New Development Bank (NDB) and explore initiatives like a BRICS reserve currency to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. China’s advances in central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and cross-border payment systems could gain traction as an alternative to the SWIFT network, potentially reducing the dollar’s dominance in trade finance.

The U.S. administration’s policies present a critical moment of reckoning for the Global South and BRICS nations. The financial channels — trade, energy, technology, debt, and geopolitical realignment — are all poised for significant disruption. However, amidst these challenges lies an opportunity to foster greater economic resilience and independence. The path forward will require strategic adaptability, bold structural reforms, and the creation of robust institutions to strengthen political and social stability — essential prerequisites for the Global South’s sustained growth and prosperity.

This period of uncertainty could catalyze reform and rebuilding efforts across the developing world, reducing reliance on advanced economies for financing, market access, and leniency in meeting global economic and financial standards. It opens the door for greater cooperation within the Global South or even for China and India to assume more prominent roles as economic and financial partners to other developing nations. By diversifying trade partnerships, fostering regional cooperation, and innovating in critical areas such as climate finance, digital payments, technology, space, and artificial intelligence, the Global South can mitigate the fallout of U.S. protectionism and carve out a more autonomous path forward.

Scenario-based planning and strategic foresight are essential for these nations to identify common ground, assess potential outcomes, and craft cohesive responses. The stakes are high, and a lack of coordinated action could leave them vulnerable to economic polarization. The U.S., too, must tread carefully. Overextending protectionist policies could provoke collective retaliation from the Global South — many of these nations are significant producers of primary goods essential to the U.S. economy and vital markets for American-made products.

The question remains: Will the nations of the Global South rise to this challenge, leveraging disruption as a springboard for transformation? Or will the ripple effects of “America First” policies leave them struggling to keep pace in an increasingly divided and competitive global economy? The answers will define not just their future, but the contours of the global economic order in the years to come.

Udaibir Das is a Distinguished Fellow at ORF America.

The NCAER-NSE Business Expectations Survey for India Third Quarter 2024–25

The National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), one of India’s premier economic policy research think tanks, carried out the 131th Round of its Business Expectations Survey (BES) in December 2024, with support from the National Stock Exchange of India Limited (NSE). NCAER has been carrying out the BES every quarter since 1992, covering 496 firms across four regions.

2025 could be the tipping point for India’s economic aspirations

What the year means for India’s ascent.

The historical resonance of 2025 cannot be overstated. It marks the halfway point to achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, reflecting progress and challenges in poverty alleviation, gender equality and climate action. It is an especially pivotal year in advancing regional commitments, such as the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, which will also evaluate progress in mobilising resources.

Amid these global shifts, India stands at a critical juncture. The world’s most populous democracy faces a turbulent landscape of geopolitical rivalries, technological shifts and the urgency of climate action. The question remains: will global economic forces propel India toward leadership or will they impede its ascent?

Since the Middle Ages, India’s economic journey has been shaped by its participation in global trade and financial shifts. After a period of insulation, the 1990s marked its gradual reintegration into the global economy. Yet today, the stakes are higher than ever. With a slowing global economy and unpredictable global financial conditions, India must navigate external headwinds while fostering domestic resilience.

Geoeconomic recalibration

The world’s economic order is increasingly fragmented, driven by rivalries shaping trade, technology and financial flows. This disruption creates both risks and opportunities for India. The country’s recent push to settle trade in rupees instead of dollars indicates an ambition to assert greater economic sovereignty. However, limited international adoption of the rupee and complex relationship management across competing blocs emphasise the challenges of asserting such sovereignty in a fragmented world.

The global economy is beginning to reflect the effects of shifting demographics, including ageing populations, uneven consumption patterns across sectors and regional variations in savings behaviour. Some areas are seeing elevated savings post-pandemic while others are experiencing declines. Additionally, advanced economies are projected to grow at a modest 1.4% in 2025, while India’s economy is expected to expand by at least 6.3% – outperforming advanced and emerging markets. However, slower growth in advanced economies could dampen demand for Indian exports, particularly in IT and manufacturing sectors.

The challenge lies in sustaining domestic reform momentum while recalibrating India’s global strategy. Domestic self-sufficiency and external engagement must work together to ensure India’s resilience against global uncertainties over the coming decades.

The debt-climate-development nexus

Compounding these challenges is the issue of debt. At $307tn, global debt has reached unprecedented levels, heightening vulnerabilities. For many economies, supply-side bottlenecks and climate-related shocks exacerbate fiscal pressures, reducing their capacity to fund development and climate adaptation. India’s debt-to-gross domestic product ratio – at approximately 83% – is lower than that of many advanced economies but remains elevated compared to pre-pandemic levels. Fiscal prudence will therefore be critical to ensuring sustainable growth. Effectively absorbing budgetary resources as well as leveraging external financing for infrastructure and renewable energy projects will be key to addressing long-term development needs.

Moreover, emerging markets faced nearly $1tn in capital outflows over the past year, exposing the fragility of global investment flows. While India’s macroeconomic fundamentals have provided some insulation, managing the volatility of international capital markets remains a challenge. Foreign exchange reserves, though substantial, may fall short of the scale and flexibility required to meet India’s funding needs in a highly competitive global environment.

Advancing climate resiliency

The climate crisis presents both a challenge and an opportunity for India. As one of the most climate-vulnerable nations, India faces the dual task of mitigating risks and leading green energy transitions. Initiatives like the International Solar Alliance highlight India’s commitment to shaping the global green agenda.

However, climate finance remains a critical bottleneck. COP30 will test India’s ability to advocate for equitable finance mechanisms while balancing domestic fiscal priorities. India must align its climate resilience efforts with broader domestic development goals to lead on climate action effectively.

The digital revolution

There is, however, an avenue for India to assert global leadership and that is in the frontier of space technology, artificial intelligence and digital finance. The Unified Payments Interface, a homegrown digital payments system, has revolutionised financial inclusion, particularly in rural areas, and inspired adoption by other countries. This positions India as a global innovator in digital finance.

India must leverage its digital revolution to achieve economic objectives, create high-quality jobs and boost productivity to build on this momentum. However, this transformation carries risks, including cybersecurity threats, consumer protection concerns and regulatory complexities. Robust institutions, effective governance and resilient capital markets are essential to cement India’s leadership in digital finance and redefine its future.

What 2025 holds

2025 will be a litmus test for India’s ability to align immediate policy actions with its long-term vision of becoming a developed, equitable and sustainable nation by 2047 – its centenary as an independent republic. Achieving this vision requires clear, measurable milestones and, most importantly, broad social and political consensus.

India’s transformative reforms in labour markets, climate policy or digital governance must address public skepticism and ensure fairness, inclusivity and trust in institutions. Without this foundation, resistance to change could undermine progress.

Beyond its domestic goals, 2025 will be pivotal for India’s leadership in advancing the global South’s priorities and shaping Brics’ economic agenda. Addressing regional inequalities, managing inflation and unemployment, and laying the groundwork for sustainable growth will demonstrate India’s capacity to deliver on its promise of inclusive development.

India thus stands at a critical moment in its modern economic history. Its choices in 2025 will determine its trajectory toward 2047 and its influence on the global economic landscape. India’s rise as a global power is not preordained – it is a deliberate outcome of action, adaptability and durable implementation. As Indian philosopher and reformer, Swami Vivekananda, urged, ‘Arise, awake, and stop not until the goal is reached.’

Udaibir Das is a visiting professor at the National Council of Applied Economic Research, senior non-resident adviser at the Bank of England, senior adviser of the International Forum for Sovereign Wealth Funds, and distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation America. He was previously at the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.

Firm Inflation Expectations, Uncertainty and Beliefs

In this paper, we examine the dynamics between inflation uncertainty, beliefs and inflation expectations of firms. Inflation uncertainty and beliefs influence a firm’s perception of the inflation levels, thereby impacting its expected inflation. Using novel survey data on firm inflation expectations, we examine the extent to which crises influence the relationship between inflation uncertainty and inflation expectations. We find that the effect of crisis-led inflation uncertainty on inflation expectation is asymmetric. The COVID-19 pandemic increased the impact of high inflation uncertainty on inflation expectations. On the other hand, the Russia-Ukraine war reduced inflation expectations. The war effect may be attributed to geopolitical factors that helped India procure crude oil from Russia on favourable terms. Additionally, we find that the disagreement in expected inflation across firms seems to have increased in the period post-pandemic. Further, this paper analyses whether firms’ beliefs about their own performance influence inflation expectations. Performance can impact the perception of cost structure, thereby, inflation expectations. The findings suggest that firms’ beliefs about their performance are negatively associated with inflation expectations.

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