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There is a need to reimagine agriculture with the twin crises of food and energy insecurity set to challenge global priorities.

“Addressing food insecurity and energy poverty is central to achieving global stability, but tackling these issues independently is no longer sufficient,” warns the World Bank in its latest report on climate and development. The intertwined crises of food and energy security are defining the trajectory of the 21st century, casting a long shadow over global stability. Both systems are under siege — food production is strained by climate change, population growth, and inequality, while energy systems face geopolitical tensions, outdated infrastructure, and the slow transition from fossil fuels. Yet, their interconnectedness presents an even greater challenge: agriculture, a lifeline for humanity, is both a significant energy consumer and a contributor to climate change. As the world teeters on the edge of multiple tipping points, can we truly address one without confronting the other?

Dependency on carbon-intensive energy

Agriculture consumes nearly 70% of global freshwater resources and is responsible for over 20% of greenhouse gas emissions. Its dependence on fossil fuels — for mechanisation, irrigation, fertilizer production, and transportation — has created a vicious cycle of environmental degradation. This reliance also exposes food systems to energy price shocks, threatening global stability. Rising temperatures and erratic weather patterns further disrupt agricultural output, putting the livelihoods of 2.5 billion people at risk. Between 2020 and 2023, nearly 11.8% of the global population faced severe food insecurity, a figure projected to rise to 956 million by 2028.

Renewable energy investments reached $500 billion in 2022, but fossil fuel consumption remains robust due to short-term economic and geopolitical pressures. Nations such as the United States, Brazil, and Guyana continue to expand oil and gas production, prioritising exports and domestic energy security. This ongoing dependency on carbon-intensive energy exacerbates the vulnerability of global food systems, particularly in regions with limited access to reliable energy. Energy poverty reveals sharp global inequities. Low-income countries account for a small fraction of global energy demand but suffer disproportionately from supply disruptions. Extreme weather events frequently damage energy infrastructure in regions where power grids are already unreliable. In rural areas, energy deficits hinder agricultural productivity, leading to higher food prices and deepening poverty. In sub-Saharan Africa, per-hectare fertilizer usage remains far below the global average, contributing to food insecurity despite $1.9 billion spent on fertilizer imports by the top 10 African importing countries in 2021 — more than double the amount in 2016.

Agriculture’s reliance on fossil fuels further highlights its vulnerability. Natural gas, critical for fertilizer production, is both a feedstock and an energy source, with 80% of it used for ammonia synthesis and 20% powering the process. Volatility in natural gas prices directly impacts fertilizer costs and global food prices. Geopolitical actions, such as China’s 2021 ban on phosphate fertilizer exports, disrupt agricultural supply chains. India, which imports 60% of its diammonium phosphate (DAP) fertilizers, experienced significant delays during critical cropping seasons, exposing its vulnerability to external shocks.

Renewable energy offers a glimmer of hope, but its deployment remains uneven. High-income countries installed 83% of new renewable capacity in 2022, leaving low-income nations reliant on outdated, carbon-intensive systems. While solar-powered irrigation and biomass energy solutions could transform agriculture, high costs and inadequate infrastructure limit their reach. The transition risks bypassing those who need it most.

Demands on agriculture

Meanwhile, agriculture is being increasingly burdened with competing demands. Beyond feeding a growing population, it is expected to support the global energy transition by producing biofuels. This dual role often pits food security against energy needs, as biofuel production requires vast land and water resources. In a world where nearly 12% of the population faces hunger, is prioritising energy over food morally defensible? The financial costs of addressing food and energy insecurity are substantial yet achievable. The World Food Security Outlook estimates that ensuring basic caloric needs for the world’s most vulnerable populations will require $90 billion annually until 2030. Tackling malnutrition among women and children demands an additional $11 billion per year, while transforming global food systems could cost $300 billion–$400 billion annually —just 0.5% of global GDP. However, for low-income nations, these costs are staggering, with food insecurity expenses in some cases surpassing 95% of GDP.

The implications of inaction are dire. Food insecurity is projected to cost the global economy trillions in lost productivity and adverse health outcomes. Climate-induced energy disruptions threaten to destabilise entire regions, driving social unrest and mass migration. For example, Africa’s mineral wealth, essential for renewable technologies, is often extracted without benefiting local economies, perpetuating cycles of poverty and underdevelopment.

Need for inclusivity

Despite record investments in renewables, fossil fuel expansions continue unabated. Every delay compounds the human, environmental, and economic costs, narrowing opportunities for a resilient future. Clean energy solutions must address structural barriers to inclusivity, ensuring that the most vulnerable communities are not left behind.

Ultimately, the twin crises of food and energy insecurity challenge global priorities. The solutions are within reach, but they require a fundamental shift in perspective. Agriculture must be reimagined as both a source of sustenance and a cornerstone of sustainable development. Failure to act will create the risk of pushing millions into hunger and undermining global climate goals. As the clock ticks, the question remains: will the world rise to meet the moment?

Anupama Sen is associated with the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO), University of Sussex. Amit Mitra is with the National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.

India’s research ecosystem stands on the cusp of a seismic shift with the impending rollout of the One Nation, One Subscription (ONOS) scheme, a Rs 6,000-crore initiative aimed at dismantling the long-standing barriers to accessing global academic resources.

Boasting the promise of providing 13,000 international journals to over 6,300 institutions and nearly 18 million researchers and students, ONOS seeks to upend the narrative of restricted knowledge, which has long hampered Indian academia.

Yet, amidst the applause, one cannot help but ask: can this scheme genuinely revolutionize the Indian research landscape, or will it remain another incomplete policy, leaving many behind? The promise of ONOS is indeed significant. For institutions that currently cannot afford subscriptions, this initiative has the potential to level the playing field. It aligns with India’s growing aspirations to enhance its research output, which saw a 54 per cent rise between 2017 and 2022, more than double the global average of 22 per cent. India now ranks fourth globally in terms of research publication volume, producing over 1.3 million academic papers.

However, this numerical achievement is tempered by the quality and impact of the research. India lags behind in global citation indices, ranking ninth in the world, well below peers like China, the US, and the UK. This disparity raises critical questions about the accessibility and visibility of Indian research – a problem that ONOS can address, but only partially. The scheme’s reliance on centralized access assumes that all institutions have the means to effectively utilize these resources.

Without parallel investments in research capacity and infrastructure, merely providing access to journals may not be enough to bridge the gap between top-tier and under-resourced institutions. Moreover, the ONOS scheme raises another critical issue: the uneven focus on STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Medicine) disciplines. While it will undoubtedly benefit researchers in these fields, the humanities and social sciences remain an afterthought in India’s research ecosystem. These disciplines already suffer from poor output and global visibility. For instance, in 2020, India produced 26,127 gold open-access (OA) articles, predominantly in STEM fields, while research in social sciences and humanities barely made a dent in global databases.

This neglect is exacerbated by the lack of funding for humanities research, further marginalizing disciplines crucial for understanding societal issues. Can ONOS truly address the inequities across disciplines, or will it reinforce the STEM-centric nature of India’s research priorities? The problem extends beyond subscription access to the publication process itself. In the age of openaccess publishing, researchers face significant financial barriers. In 2020, Indian authors paid a staggering $17 million in Article Processing Charges (APCs) to publish their work in openaccess journals.

This represented more than half of the $30 million spent globally, with health sciences alone accounting for $7 million of the total. These costs are predominantly borne by researchers themselves, as most Indian institutions lack dedicated funding mechanisms for APCs. This contrasts sharply with developed countries where national policies often subsidize such expenses, ensuring that research remains accessible to global audiences. Without similar support, Indian researchers struggle to disseminate their work widely, further limiting its impact and citation scores. Even for STEM researchers, APCs pose a significant burden, but the humanities and social sciences are hit hardest. Journals in these disciplines often lack the funding and market size to adopt sustainable open-access models.

As a result, Indian research in these fields remains confined to limited local publications or locked behind expensive paywalls, accessible to only a few. This creates a vicious cycle: without global visibility, Indian social science research struggles to attract citations, funding, or recognition, perpetuating its marginalization. India’s education and research funding landscape amplifies the challenges ONOS seeks to address. Allocating just 3.85 per cent of its GDP to education well below the global average of 4.22 per cent and far behind Cuba’s 12 per cent India underfunds a system where over 50,000 colleges and 1,100 universities struggle with uneven quality, particularly in rural areas.

Research funding fares no better, with Rs 2,985 crore spent on journal subscriptions between 2019 and 2022, largely benefiting elite institutions while leaving smaller colleges and researchers behind. This imbalance stifles innovation and limits equitable access to knowledge. While ONOS is a step forward, it is no panacea. Addressing systemic barriers – like inadequate funding, exorbitant APC costs, and the neglect of humanities and social sciences – is critical. Without national APC funds, open-access mandates, and investments in underrepresented disciplines, India’s vision of global research leadership by 2047 risks becoming a pipe dream. Will ONOS empower all or widen existing gaps? The answer lies in what comes next.

The writers are associated with the National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi. Views are personal.

Adopting legislative measures that raise the minimum age for consumption of tobacco products can help restrict adolescents and youth access to them.

India’s pan, tobacco, and intoxicants industry remains robust, even as the government enforces measures to curb consumption. Tobacco continues to be a significant public health risk, contributing to rising noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) and economic losses. According to the NSS Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) 2023-24, consumption of pan, tobacco, and intoxicants persists across a large section of Indian households, with wide-ranging implications on household finances, education, and economic priorities. 

The scale of tobacco use

India is home to 29 per cent of the world’s tobacco users, second only to China. Tobacco-related diseases account for around 1.35 million deaths annually, making it a leading cause of preventable deaths in the country. NCDs, including heart disease, cancer, and respiratory conditions, are closely linked to tobacco and intoxicants. Data from NSS CES 2023-24 reveals that 68.3 per cent of households across the country consume tobacco and other intoxicants in some form, with the prevalence notably higher in rural areas (74.9 per cent) compared to urban areas (53.8 per cent). 

Economic costs

The economic impact of tobacco on households is profound. According to WHO estimates, in 2017-18, India lost over ₹1.7 lakh crore due to tobacco-related diseases, including healthcare costs and productivity losses from premature deaths — over three times the health allocation of the Union Budget in same period, highlighting the immense economic burden of tobacco consumption.

Beyond national-level economic losses, pan, tobacco, and intoxicants also imposes a significant financial burden on individual households. According to NSS CES 2023-24, households consuming these substances spend 4.8 per cent of their total expenditure on them — substantial when compared to the 3.6 per cent spent on education. In contrast, non-consuming households spend more on education, allocating 5.8 per cent of their total expenditure to this area.

Disparities in household expenditure

The NSS CES 2023-24 data further reveals disparities in how different income groups allocate their expenditure, particularly between households consuming pan, tobacco, and intoxicants and those that do not. When analysed by Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (MPCE) quintiles, the share of household spending on these substances remains relatively constant among their users across all income levels, ranging from4.6 per cent in Quintile 2 to 5.1 per cent in Quintile 4. This suggests that tobacco consumption is largely inelastic, meaning it is not significantly influenced by increases in household income.

However, the same cannot be said for spending on education. Among non-consuming households, education spending rises significantly as income increases, from2.8 per cent in Quintile 1 to 7.5 per cent in Quintile 5. This positive correlation between income and education investment demonstrates that non-tobacco-consuming households prioritise education as their financial capacity improves. In contrast, households consuming pan, tobacco, and intoxicants allocate less to education, even in higher-income quintiles, with spending on education peaking at 5.2 per cent in Quintile 5.

State-level data further highlights these disparities, especially in regions with high pan, tobacco, and intoxicants consumption. In north-eastern States with extremely high consumption rates, often over 90 per cent by households, the link between spending on these substances and education investment is particularly troubling. For instance, in Meghalaya (96.9 per cent), Arunachal Pradesh (93.9 per cent), and Mizoram (91.8 percent), households allocate 6.5 per cent to 8.1 per cent of their expenditure to pan, tobacco, or intoxicants, while spending on education remains very low, around 2 percent in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. This imbalance diverts resources from education, worsening long-term socioeconomic challenges in these areas.

Even in States with lower prevalence of these substances, like Kerala (22.9 per cent) and Punjab (37.8 per cent), a similar pattern emerges. This disparity highlights how consumption of these substances diverts financial resources away from education, deepening long-term socioeconomic challenges. 

New strategies needed

The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act (COTPA), along with other legislative measures, has established a framework to regulate the sale and consumption of tobacco in India. While these regulations have led to a decline in overall prevalence, usage remains widespread.

According to the Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) 2, 96 per cent of adults are aware of the health risks associated with smokeless tobacco. Yet, 12.4 per cent of individuals aged 15 to 24 still consume tobacco. Furthermore, The Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS) 2019 further highlights that 55 per cent of lifelong tobacco users begin the habit before turning 20.

To break the deeply ingrained tobacco habits prevention efforts must target non-users, especially adolescents and youth. Young people often imitate the behaviours of their elders, making it even more vital to target this age group. NSS CES 2023-24 data, approximately 168 million individuals aged15-24 live in households that consume these products. Early exposure to nicotine significantly increases the chances of continued use into adulthood, as young brains are particularly vulnerable to addiction.

Adopting legislative measures, such as the US2019 law that raised the minimum age for tobacco sales from 18 to 21, could help restrict adolescents and youth access to tobacco products. By implementing similar strategies, India can enhance its fight against tobacco use and safeguard the health of future generations.

The writer is an Associate Fellow, National Council of Applied Economic Research.

Opinion: Barry Eichengreen.

There is now a conventional narrative in the markets about the short- and medium-term prospects of the dollar.

In the short run the dollar will continue to strengthen, as an unprecedented confluence of domestic and foreign forces push it up. Foreign exchange traders are focused on Donald Trump imposing tariffs on his return to the White House. His latest blast on his social media channel Truth Social suggests plans for tariffs of 25 per cent on imports from Canada and Mexico, and an extra 10 per cent on China.

These new taxes will shift spending by American consumers away from now more expensive foreign goods. Given record low unemployment and the limited capacity of US manufacturing to expand production, something will have to give. Namely, the dollar will have to appreciate to shift some of that spending back towards imports, which are in more elastic supply.

Moreover, extending Trump’s tax cuts enacted in his first administration as Republicans in Congress aspire to do, and then adding yet more tax cuts on tips, social security payments and who knows what else will only goose US spending still further. Given that American households disproportionately consume domestically produced goods, this will worsen the incipient excess demand for US products.

It will require yet more dollar appreciation to shift a portion of that spending towards foreign supplies.

Treasury secretary designate Scott Bessent may be a balanced budget man, and his crack team of cost cutters — Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy — have high ambitions. But if recent decades have taught us one thing, it is that cutting taxes is easier than cutting spending. The dollar’s behaviour is a clear signal that investors expect the budget deficit to widen.

Central banks of course will do nothing to moderate the dollar’s rise — on the contrary. Tariffs pushing up US import prices will be inflationary. Even if a one-time increase in tariff rates leads only to a one-time increase in prices, the Federal Reserve has learned that households dislike one-time increases in prices as much as ongoing inflation.

Having been taught this chastening lesson, the central bank will react more strongly to the next burst of inflation than it did in 2021-22. There will be tension with the new administration, no doubt, with Trump and Bessent both being Fed critics. But Jay Powell and colleagues are unlikely to be deterred.

The European Central Bank and the People’s Bank of China, meanwhile, will be quite happy to see their currencies fall. The European economy is in dire straits, and Europe lacks the political will to lend it fiscal support. The ECB, not for the first time, is the only game in town. A euro at parity against the dollar is now clearly on the cards.

Meanwhile, the good standing at home of the Chinese government of Xi Jinping rests on its ability to hit, or at least come within hailing distance of, its growth targets. With Trump clamping down on not just US-China trade but also on Chinese products assembled and routed through countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam, the blow to Chinese growth will be considerable.

To be sure, a sharply lower renminbi would dent Chinese consumer confidence and elicit aggressive action by an angry American president.  But a renminbi that falls by a limited amount, say by 10 per cent against the dollar, thereby boosting Chinese exports to other markets, might be just what Xi would want.

In the medium term, however, the dollar is likely to give back these short-term gains, and then some. Tariffs and tax policy aside, the strength of the dollar has rested on the strength of the US economy, which has consistently outperformed Europe and other parts of the world. Tariffs on imported inputs, which will impart a negative supply shock to US manufacturing, are incompatible with that strength.

Moreover, the higher interest rates adopted by the Fed to damp down inflation will not be investment friendly. Neither will eliminating the investment subsidies and tax credits of the Chips Act, the Inflation Reduction Act and other Biden-era initiatives. None of this will be good for growth.

Above all, we know that economic policy uncertainty has a strong negative effect on investment. And Trump is an uncertainty machine.

At some point, foreign exchange traders will cotton on to this fact. Clearly, then, the short- and longer-term prospects of the dollar are at odds. The key to successful investing and forecasting is identifying the turning point. If only I — and the markets — could offer more guidance on that.

The writer is professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley .