The BRICS Currency Charade

Expressions of dissatisfaction with the global dominance of the dollar go back at least to French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1965. But even today, the euro is no challenger to the greenback, and no one should hold their breath waiting for the BRICS to unveil their own attempt at an alternative currency.

Last month’s BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, was, like all summits, heavy on photo ops. And it yielded a second act that was similarly heavier on symbolism than substance: the release of a report by the Russian finance ministry and central bank on “improvement of the international monetary and financial system,” by which Russian officials obviously meant “finding an alternative to the weaponized dollar.”

Expressions of dissatisfaction with the dominance of the dollar over global money and finance go back at least to French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1965, who famously lamented the greenback’s “exorbitant privilege.” Indeed, the desire for an alternative played no small part in the creation of the euro 34 years later.

Herein lies the rub for the BRICS (named for its founding members Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Creating the euro took 34 years. It necessarily built on a half-century of other steps that deepened European integration and established shared political institutions. And the euro, in any case, has shown no signs of challenging the dollar, or even of modestly denting its global supremacy.

Policymakers in emerging markets have in fact offered a long list of possible substitutes for the dollar. None of their proposals has borne fruit. In 2009, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) Governor Zhou Xiaochuan suggested replacing dollar reserves with the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights. It quickly became apparent that no one was particularly interested in holding, much less using, an artificial asset pegged to an arbitrary currency basket.

Chinese officials then embarked on a campaign to promote use of the renminbi in international payments. In fact, Chinese firms now settle a majority of their cross-border transactions in renminbi. Globally, however, the renminbi accounts for less than 6% of trade settlements, while Chinese capital controls and governance issues limit the currency’s utility for financial transactions. Despite having built a Cross-Border Interbank Payments System, Chinese banks clear barely 3% of the daily transactions, by value, of US-based clearing houses.

Then came proposals for a BRICS currency, constituted as a weighted average of existing BRICS currencies, or perhaps backed by gold or other commodities. But a BRICS basket currency was not a natural fit for any of its member countries’ exporters. With no BRICS equivalent of the European Central Bank, which manages the euro, or of the European Parliament, to which the ECB answers, fundamental questions – like who would manage it – remained unanswered.

A gold-backed currency would have obvious appeal to major gold producers like Russia and South Africa. But payments would be expensive, insofar as they involved actual gold shipments. If “gold-backed” meant convertible into gold at the prevailing market price, then the unit would not be stable. If it meant convertible at a fixed price, this would be tantamount to donning the straitjacket of the gold standard.

There have since been discussions of local currency settlement, like those occupying Russia and India for much of 2023. But this could work only if bilateral trade were perfectly balanced, with neither country having much appetite for accumulating the currency of the other. The benefits of multilateral trade would be lost. Predictably, these Russia-India talks led nowhere – except to Kazan.

The Russian report to the BRICS summit recommended a common platform for cross-border payments using a set of BRICS central-bank digital currencies. This could avoid having to go through the dollar, the US banking system, and the SWIFT interbank payment service. The Bank for International Settlements has helped to develop such a platform, known as Project mBridge, with the participation of five central banks, including the PBOC, which is said to be privy to the technical details, having designed many of them. The accession of additional emerging markets could provide for own-currency settlement while preserving a modicum of multilateralism. Participants might be happy about holding one another’s currencies now that these were usable at low cost throughout the bloc.

But if the technological problem has been solved, the governance problem remains. Participants would have to agree on who to license as foreign-exchange dealers on the platform, or on the exchange rate at which to execute trades algorithmically. They would have to agree on who was responsible for providing liquidity, and under what conditions. They would have to agree on a dispute-settlement mechanism. They would have to agree on privacy and data-protection laws and practices, and how to guard against cyber threats. They would have to agree on the enforcement of anti-money-laundering rules. They would have to agree on which central banks could join over time. They would have to agree on ownership and voting shares, analogous to ownership and voting shares in SWIFT.

In their Kazan Declaration, summit participants limply “recognized” the role of the BRICS in improving the international monetary and financial system, and “took note” of the Russian report. No one should be surprised that they failed to do more.

Barry Eichengreen, Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is a former senior policy adviser at the International Monetary Fund. He is the author of many books, including In Defense of Public Debt (Oxford University Press, 2021).

It’s not social constraints or access anymore — women are held back by lack of employment opportunities

Of the four key areas that define women’s empowerment, personal efficacy, power in intra-household negotiations, societal engagement, and access to income-generating activities, we see improvements in the first three domains. In contrast, the fourth — access to employment — has stagnated.

As economists struggle to explain the stagnation in women’s participation in wage work in India, conservative social norms have emerged as a handy target to explain why rising economic prosperity has not translated into greater employment for women. However, this assumption of social stagnation has little basis in reality. The India Human Development Survey (IHDS), organised by the University of Maryland and the National Council of Applied Economic Research, has tracked changes in the lives of Indian households between 2004 and 2024. This survey of over 42,000 households documents steady changes in Indian women’s lives and highlights the aspirational transformation that young Indian women in the 2020s are living through compared to their sisters who came of age in the first decade of the century.

The second wave of IHDS was conducted in 2011-12, and the third wave covering the period 2022-24 was recently completed. Here, I focus on interviews with approximately 18,000 married and unmarried women, aged 20-29, in each wave. Ten years is a relatively short time, but this decade was pivotal for changing the course of how young Indian women live their lives.

Over this decade, Indian parents have increased their investments in developing their daughters’ capabilities. Parental aspiration for their children — both sons and daughters — has grown rapidly, resulting in a massive increase in education. Today, the gender gap in education has virtually disappeared, and girls seem poised to outdistance boys. In 2011-12, IHDS found that 27 per cent of 20-29 year-old women had completed class 12 and only 12 per cent had a college degree. In 2022-24, more than 50 per cent had completed class 12 and 26 per cent had a college degree. More importantly, there was no difference between the proportion of young men and young women with a college degree. This increase in girls’ education was accompanied by delayed marriage. In 2011-12, 76 per cent of the women in their 20s were married, by 2022-24 the proportion had dropped to 66 per cent.

This expansion of girlhood allowed women to expand control over their own lives. Marriage remains a family affair, but whereas only 42 per cent of young women in 2012 had any input in selecting their partners, by 2022, 52 per cent did. Premarital contact between spouses has historically been low, but is increasing sharply. In 2011, 30 per cent of women met their husbands before marriage, and 27 per cent connected via phone, WhatsApp, or email. By 2022, this proportion was 42 per cent and 54 per cent, respectively. Many of these changes reflect how women view their lives and families. While 23 per cent of young women in 2012 thought having more sons than daughters was essential, the proportion had fallen to 12 per cent by 2022.

Young women also began to expand their connection with the world around them. The proportion of women who felt comfortable travelling a short distance alone by bus or train grew from 42 per cent to 54 per cent, and membership in Self Help Groups increased from 10 per cent to 18 per cent for women in their 20s. Even political engagement has increased slightly; in 2012, 6 per cent attended a political meeting of a gram sabha or ward committee; by 2022, this proportion was 8 per cent.

These are not revolutionary changes; women continue to negotiate their lives within various constraints. But the sum total of these changes reflects the ongoing transformation in the social and normative climate in which Indian women live their lives.

However, the one area where a transformation has not even begun relates to economic opportunities. Women continue to contribute to the economy by working on family farms, and the Periodic Labour Force Survey has documented a substantial increase in this work. However, participation by women in wage labour has stagnated. The IHDS shows that the proportion of 20-29 year old women in wage labour was 18 per cent in 2012, falling to 14 per cent in 2022. Some of it may be due to increased college enrollment, but even for women in their 30s, participation in wage labour stagnated.

The new economic orthodoxy tells us that women’s low levels of employment are because of restrictive social norms that look down on families where women work. However, among married women in our sample who were not employed, 73 per cent in 2011 said they would be happy to work if they could find suitable jobs; this proportion had grown to 80 per cent in 2022. Moreover, 72 per cent said their families would allow them to work if they could find a suitable job. These do not simply reflect wishful thinking. When MGNREGA started paying women the same amount as men, women jumped in with both feet to seek out even manual work. Today, more women work under MGNREGA than men. Improvements in transportation systems have also contributed to increased non-farm work by women.

Of the four key areas that define women’s empowerment, personal efficacy, power in intra-household negotiations, societal engagement, and access to income-generating activities, we see improvements in the first three domains. In contrast, the fourth —access to employment — has stagnated. It is time to invite India’s daughters to partake in the fruits of economic development; they have clearly shown that they are ready and willing to help harvest the gender dividend. 

The writer is Professor and Centre Director, NCAER Data Innovation Centre and Professor Emerita, University of Maryland. Views are personal.

Beyond the Billions: Problems with the G20’s Plan for Multilateral Development Banks

The G20’s “Roadmap Towards Better, Bigger, and More Effective Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)” is an ambitious blueprint for transforming MDBs to address global development challenges. The roadmap sets bold objectives: scaling MDBs’ financing capacity, fostering collaboration, and integrating climate-related goals into development strategies. These priorities underscore a strategic shift toward a more responsive, impactful multilateral finance system. Yet, while this roadmap reflects significant forward-thinking, several areas call for more specific attention and clearer pathways for actionable outcomes. These gaps — especially regarding governance, private sector engagement, and debt sustainability — are crucial if MDBs are to realize their full potential in aiding low-income and developing economies.

Among the roadmap’s most promising aspects is its target of enhancing MDB lending capacity by $300–400 billion over the coming decade. This increase is essential to meet the financing needs of developing economies, aligning with the G20’s Capital Adequacy Framework (CAF) Review, which promotes the optimal use of MDB balance sheets. Expanding MDB capacity can address a broad spectrum of urgent needs, from poverty alleviation and infrastructure to climate adaptation. However, the roadmap stops short of outlining how these funds will be generated — a critical element for effective implementation. Another strength lies in the roadmap’s call for enhanced collaboration among MDBs. By promoting synergy, the G20 aims to optimize each institution’s unique strengths, mitigate operational redundancies, and amplify collective impact. Such an approach is increasingly relevant as MDBs tackle intertwined issues like climate change and financial stability. The roadmap’s focus on aligning MDBs with the Paris Agreement objectives acknowledges climate risks as systemic threats, ensuring that MDB resources are directed toward sustainable and resilient growth. Notably, the World Bank set up the Global Collaborative Co-Financing platform as a convening mechanism earlier this year to help improve coordination among Multilateral Development Banks and other co-financing partners. One objective is that, in its mature form, the platform will enable it to channel additional capital for development scale and impact.

However, some crucial gaps in the roadmap may hinder its implementation and broader effectiveness. A primary concern is the lack of a concrete governance reform framework. Current MDB governance structures often underrepresent the interests and voices of developing nations, risking an imbalance that could undermine MDBs’ ability to address diverse global challenges. Historical precedents, such as the Bretton Woods institutions’ reform after WWII, underscore how governance restructuring has been critical in adapting to shifting global economic power. A lack of representation for developing economies risks perpetuating an imbalance that could impede the MDBs’ effectiveness. This aspect ties directly to themes from the recent BRICS Kazan Declaration. The role of underrepresented voices in multilateral settings is increasingly seen as pivotal for effectiveness.

Furthermore, while the roadmap acknowledges the need for private-sector engagement, it does not offer specific, actionable strategies. The private sector is crucial to scaling climate and infrastructure investments but mobilizing private capital requires more than intentions. The roadmap could benefit from clear strategies for risk-sharing mechanisms, public-private partnerships, and blended finance models. As discussed in ORF America’s Background Paper #13, Rebooting Development Finance: An Agenda for Reforming Multilateral Development Banks, private sector confidence hinges on robust instruments that effectively mitigate risks while aligning with their investment return expectations. The Asian Development Bank’s recent success in leveraging private finance for climate projects is a testament to the power of such mechanisms when tailored to investor needs. For MDBs to attract substantial private capital, they must introduce a sophisticated financial instrument toolkit that bridges the public and private sectors.

Debt sustainability is another crucial area where the roadmap needs to catch up. Many developing countries already grapple with high debt burdens, and MDBs play a critical role in providing concessional finance and supporting debt restructuring. While institutions like the IMF and World Bank have advanced global debt discussions, MDBs must engage actively to prevent their financing from aggravating existing debt challenges. The interconnectedness of MDB lending and debt sustainability makes it essential for MDBs to incorporate debt assessments into project planning, ensuring that lending practices support long-term financial health.

Realizing the roadmap’s ambitions will entail significant operational shifts within MDBs. Resource mobilization, for instance, is essential for scaling up lending, but the roadmap lacks clear strategies for securing additional capital or leveraging innovative financing. The G20’s Independent Expert Group has underscored the need for actionable plans. MDBs could struggle to translate the roadmap’s targets into effective financial solutions without tangible commitments from major shareholders. Operational efficiency is another area crucial to the roadmap’s success. To meet expanded mandates, MDBs must improve processes to facilitate faster project approval and disbursement, particularly for climate and infrastructure projects that require agility. The G20 sustainable finance working group’s recommendations on streamlining accreditation and reducing approval times are critical if MDBs are to respond effectively in an evolving financial landscape. The roadmap also lacks a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework, essential for tracking progress and adjusting strategies. Establishing metrics and timelines is necessary to assess reform implementation and identify potential obstacles. The Center for Global Development’s MDB Reform Tracker offers a helpful benchmark model, highlighting areas where MDBs have succeeded or need improvement.

The roadmap’s impact extends significantly to low-income and developing countries. The proposed increase in MDB financing could give these countries greater access to affordable capital for critical projects, accelerating their progress toward Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Integrating climate considerations into MDB mandates allows for targeted climate adaptation and resilience support, helping vulnerable nations manage climate-related risks. Enhanced MDB collaboration could strengthen capacity-building efforts, enabling low-income countries to build the skills and institutions needed for sustainable development. By making MDB resources more accessible and tailored to local needs, the roadmap offers the potential to bolster long-term economic stability and resilience across regions where it is most needed.

The roadmap’s success will have profound implications for global finance. By addressing systemic risks such as climate change, MDBs can contribute to deepening global capital markets and a more resilient international financial system, mitigating potential economic shocks from climate events. Effective private sector mobilization, if realized, could redirect capital flows towards sustainable projects worldwide, fostering a more balanced and resilient global finance landscape. Furthermore, the emphasis on collaboration could serve as a precedent for more robust multilateral responses to shared challenges, potentially setting a new standard for international financial cooperation to aid global financial stability.

The G20’s roadmap for MDB reform is a bold step toward reimagining multilateral finance for a world facing unprecedented challenges. However, the roadmap’s success will depend on closing critical gaps. Governance reforms that give developing countries a greater voice, concrete strategies to mobilize private capital and comprehensive debt sustainability measures are essential for realizing its vision. Drawing from institutional evolution and recent financial crises, MDBs have a unique opportunity to align more closely with global needs. By addressing these areas, MDBs can become “better, bigger, and more effective,” driving meaningful progress toward a stable and equitable global future.

Udaibir Das is Visiting Professor NCAER and Distinguished Fellow at ORF America.  Views are personal.

Women’s financial literacy: What India can learn from Australia, Rwanda, Japan

In India, where only 33% of women have an active bank account compared with 45% of men, the consequences for financial inclusion and economic growth are significant.

By gaining greater control over their finances, women can lift themselves and their families financially and reduce their vulnerability to economic hardship.

A financially literate and economically empowered female population means more informed financial decisions at the household level, increased savings and investment, and ultimately, a more robust and inclusive economy. In an era of complex financial landscapes, the persistent gender gap in financial literacy remains a significant barrier to women’s economic empowerment.

This disparity, evident both globally and in India, demands urgent attention. Recent data from the 2023 OECD/INFE International Survey reveals that women globally score less than men in financial well-being and resilience.

The S&P Global FinLit Survey states that worldwide, 35% of men and 30% of women are financially literate. In India, the situation is even more pronounced, with only 21% of women deemed financially literate compared with 27% of men, according to a 2020-21 National Centre for Financial Education (NCFE) survey.

The gender gap in labour force participation directly impacts women’s financial independence and literacy. By gaining greater control over their finances, women can lift themselves and their families financially, reduce their vulnerability to economic hardship, protect themselves from exploitation in the informal sector, and enhance their capacity to participate fully in productive, measurable economic activities.

The International Labour Organization’sWorld Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2023 report sheds further light on the gender disparities in the global labour market. The report highlights that the global gender gap in labour force participation remained stagnant in 2022, with 47.4% of women participating in the labour force compared with 72.3% of men.

The gender wage gap further exacerbates the financial literacy divide. The ILO report emphasises that women are more likely to be in informal employment, particularly in lowand lower-middle-income countries.

Government initiatives

In India, over 90% of women in the workforce are in informal employment and such prevalence of informal work often correlates with lower wages, job insecurity, and limited access to financial services and education. The Global Wage Report of 2022-23 cites women’s average pay across the world is at about 20% less than men.

In India, it is even worse, with women earning, on an average, 34% less than men for performing the same job. This disparity affects women’s current financial situation as well as their long-term financial planning and security.

India requires an effective, well monitored multi-pronged strategy that integrates financial education into school curricula nationwide

To meet the challenge, the Indian government has launched several initiatives. The Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana has made strides in financial inclusion, with women holding about 55% of the 460 million accounts opened.

The National Strategy for Financial Education and the financial literacy efforts of the government and regulators aim to promote financial knowledge, especially among women and the rural population. The Digital Sakhi Programme of the Reserve Bank of India provides training for rural women in digital financial literacy, aiming to bridge both gender and digital divides.

Women with lower financial literacy are less likely to participate in the financial markets, more prone to debt, and less prepared for retirement. In India, where only 33% of women have an active bank account compared with 45% of men, the consequences for financial inclusion and economic growth are significant.

To truly close the gap, we need to look beyond to learn from global innovative approaches. Sweden’s financial literacy programme, integrated into the national curriculum from an early age, offers a model for early intervention

Australia’s Women’s Money Toolkit provides tailored financial advice for women at different life stages. The UK’s Money Advice Service uses behavioural insights to design more effective financial education programmes. Japan’s “Financial Park” concept offers interactive financial education experiences.

India can draw learnings from Rwanda’s success in integrating financial literacy with microfinance programmes. By coupling access to financial services with education, Rwanda has seen significant improvements in women’s financial behaviour and outcomes.

To make a quantum jump forward, India requires an effective, well monitored multi-pronged strategy that integrates financial education into school curricula nationwide, with a special focus on empowering girls. Financial literacy and education for women can be greatly enhanced through accessible and easy-to-understand modules.

Process, concept literacy

Programmes should use audio-visual booklets to effectively communicate complex topics, ensuring that women fully grasp the products and processes involved. Moreover, according to the National Strategy for Financial Inclusion (NSFI), a balanced focus on both process literacy—understanding how financial systems work—and concept literacy will empower women with practical skills, ensuring manifestation of financially prudent behaviour.

Employers should be encouraged to provide financial education programmes for female employees to help them understand and negotiate fair wages. Technology can be leveraged to develop mobile apps and digital platforms to make financial education more accessible, especially in rural areas with women focus.

Promoting successful women in finance as role models and establishing mentorship programmes is crucial, alongside the implementation of policies to close the gender wage gap and incentivise financial institutions to create products tailored to women’s needs. A gender-disaggregated research may be prioritised to address specific barriers women face in achieving effective financial literacy and equity.

In India, only 21% of women are deemed financially literate compared with 27% of men

Public-private partnerships involving government agencies, regulators, financial institutions, NGOs and tech companies can foster innovative solutions. Targeted programmes for women in the informal sector can help improve their financial literacy and access to formal financial services.

Addressing cultural barriers through awareness campaigns is essential to challenge societal norms that hinder women’s financial independence and literacy. Specific programmes for long-term financial planning and retirement savings should be calibrated to account for women’s longer life expectancy and often interrupted career paths.

Over the years, financial inclusion has evolved from a bank-driven model to a multi-stakeholder approach, with telecom service providers and fintech companies now playing key roles in advancing inclusive growth. The path to closing the gender gap in financial literacy and economic equality is clear, though challenging.

It requires sustained effort, innovation, and collaboration across sectors. By empowering women with financial knowledge and skills, and addressing systemic inequalities like the wage gap, India can not only advance gender equality but also unlock significant economic potential.

It’s time to realise that gender equality should not rest on women’s reservation or better employment opportunities but should continue to achieve sustained financial education and empowerment of women. As we work towards the goal of improving female financial literacy, we’re not just bridging knowledge and wage gaps, ensuring dignity, confidence and well-being as also paving the way for a more equitable society, stronger and more resilient society.

The time to act is now. Every step taken towards improving female financial literacy and economic equality is a step towards the Viksit Bharat.

Dr CS Mohapatra is the chair professor – IEPF, and Depannita Ghosh a research analyst -IEPF, at the National Council of Applied Economic Research

Intimate Partner Violence and Women’s Economic Empowerment

Domestic violence is a global phenomenon. We study the interplay of determinants of a woman’s risk of facing intimate partner violence (IPV) for the case of India—using information from up to 235 thousand female survey respondents and exploiting state-level variation in institutions, law enforcement and attitudes. Unless in paid and formal employment, a woman’s economic activity is associated with a higher risk of IPV. However, household and other characteristics, such as higher agency within the household, higher education of the husband, lower social acceptance of IPV, and normalization of reporting incidences of violence counter this association. At the state level, the presence of more female leaders, better reporting infrastructure for victims of IPV, and higher charge-sheeting rates are associated with a lower risk of IPV.

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