Empires were once forged in iron and fuelled by coal; today, they may fracture over elements most people cannot spell.
Empires were once forged in iron and fuelled by coal; today, they may fracture over elements most people cannot spell. In the circuitry of the modern economy, power no longer flows only through oil wells and steel plants, but through trace materials embedded deep within semiconductors, fibre optics, and defence systems. Among these quiet enablers, Germanium and Gallium occupy an outsized role. They are the backstage crew of the digital age, rarely seen, yet indispensable to the performance.
India’s industrial ambitions, from 5G expansion to semiconductor fabrication, are, in many ways, tethered to these “invisible inputs.” But herein lies the rub: what is invisible in discourse often becomes invisible in policy. Germanium is the unsung hero of fibre optics and infrared technologies; gallium is the beating heart of next-generation chips powering electric vehicles, radar systems, AI and high-speed communications. These are not mere commodities; they are foundational inputs into high-technology systems. Yet, unlike oil or coal, they do not arrive in volumes that command policy attention. They move quietly through global trade channels, often as by-products of zinc and bauxite processing.
Their supply chains are complex, and disruptions, though less visible, can have disproportionate consequences for sectors such as telecommunications, electronics, and defence manufacturing. The strategic concern is not just about resource availability, but about where processing takes place. China’s dominance in germanium and gallium extends beyond mining to refining and downstream processing. This concentration creates a structural asymmetry in global supply chains.
Recent export restrictions illustrate how control over processing can translate into geopolitical leverage. For import-dependent economies, including India, the risk is not merely price volatility but potential supply constraints in critical sectors, thereby determining the fate of India’s futuristic industries. India currently relies on imports of processed forms of these materials, often from a limited set of countries, and China dominates in that set. This dependence drives us to rethink in a geopolitical environment where supply chains are increasingly shaped by strategic considerations rather than purely market forces. India has some upstream linkages; germanium can be recovered during zinc refining, and gallium during alumina production.
India is pushing semiconductor manufacturing (PLI schemes), but no gallium refining – an incomplete value chain, and thereby ended up assembling the intrinsic chip (IC) mostly. Despite having bauxite and aluminium reserves and some zinc capacity, India lacks mining and refining infrastructure, leaving these opportunities underutilised. As a result, India’s participation is largely confined to the downstream end of the supply chain. This limits both strategic autonomy and economic gains from high-value segments of production. A related challenge is the lack of granular tracking. These materials are often embedded within broader trade classifications under the Harmonised System (HS), making it difficult to assess import dependence with precision.
Without better data visibility, policy interventions risk being delayed or misaligned. Given the constraints in domestic reserves, India’s most viable pathway is to strengthen its position in midstream processing and material recovery. This includes: Extracting trace elements from existing industrial processes (such as zinc and aluminium production) Investing more in recycling systems, particularly for electronic waste Developing technological capabilities for refining high-purity materials This approach is both feasible and strategically relevant.
Countries that lack large reserves have successfully built competitiveness by specialising in processing and value addition. For India, such investments would reduce supply risks while enabling greater participation in global value chains. The current geopolitical context, marked by efforts to diversify supply chains, creates an opportunity for India. By developing processing capacity, India can move beyond being a passive importer and position itself as a reliable intermediary in critical mineral supply chains. This would allow India to play a dual role: securing its domestic industrial needs while offering processing capabilities to partner countries seeking alternatives to concentrated supply sources. In doing so, India can strengthen its bargaining position and expand its role in emerging industrial ecosystems.
To enable this transition, three policy priorities stand out: Investment in processing infrastructure: Targeted support for refining and recovery technologies Improved trade intelligence: Better tracking of critical materials through disaggregated HS classifications Strategic partnerships: Securing feedstock through international collaborations and long-term, effective agreements For India, the challenge is not just to secure supplies of materials like germanium and gallium, but to integrate more deeply into the value chains that define their use. Without such a shift, industrial ambitions may remain exposed to external vulnerabilities. With it, India can move towards a more resilient and strategically positioned role in the global economy.
The writers are, respectively, a Research Associate and a Professor at the National Council of Applied Economic Research. Views expressed here are personal.
