Attempts to make America great again seem to centre around destroying the institutions that made American science great. It is a bad idea

As India seeks to enhance its innovation ecosystem, it is worthwhile to pay attention to opportunities and lessons from the self-inflicted wounds on American science

What do lasers, the internet, Google’s search algorithm, the gene-editing tool CRISPR-9, Wireless MIMO (multiple-input multiple-output) technology, and Covid vaccines have in common? Key innovations underlying each originated in an American university, where government grants funded initial research and were later adapted for industrial research and development. Many great American multinational companies have emerged from these foundational research breakthroughs. However, if President Donald Trump has his way, America’s golden age of creativity would soon be a distant memory. While the world is focused on the economic disruption caused by Trump’s tariffs, his short-sightedness in killing the golden goose that made the American economy soar will have longer-lasting effects. Nevertheless, there are lessons for other countries, particularly India, as the American innovation system begins to unravel.

Assaults on universities and the feeding of anti-migrant hysteria undermine the fundamental framework on which America’s technology-driven economy rests. The American innovation-industrial complex relies on three pillars: Stable support for research infrastructure within universities and non-profit institutions funded by the government, while allowing them to operate independently; an open and competitive ideas marketplace; and tapping into global talent. All three are currently under threat.

The Trump administration views universities as free riders exploiting government largesse by collecting 30 cents in overhead for each dollar going directly to support research.

This is contrary to the post-war grand bargain created under the leadership of Vannevar Bush, the first presidential scientific adviser, whereby universities were supposed to nurture scientific talent through stable provision of jobs, laboratory space, research infrastructure, including libraries, and provide seed funding for new projects. The government would support this through overhead payments on grants. Curtailing overheads to 15 per cent jeopardises this equation.

The second pillar of this troika balanced creative freedom with accountability through professional oversight. An elaborate infrastructure was put in place in institutions like the National Institutes of Health to ensure that lack of fame or connections did not hold back young researchers, and peer review by other scientists was the only criterion that grant proposals needed to satisfy. The Center for Scientific Research at NIH was always conscious of the tendency of scientific orthodoxy to dominate and suffocate innovation. It looked for ways to ensure an even playing field. The latest balloon from the administration to downplay the role of scientific review and withholding funds from research powerhouses Harvard and Johns Hopkins to ensure political compliance risks destabilising this hard-won independence. If America forgets that, when ideology or cronyism trumps fair competition, it stifles a vibrant scientific culture. It only has to look at Russia. Russian scientists did not receive a single Nobel Prize for science between 2011 and 2022, during which 61 Americans became Nobel Laureates in scientific disciplines.

Beginning with a flight of Jewish scientists from Germany, American science has benefited tremendously from the influx of international scholars. Of the 314 laureates who won their Nobel Prize while working in the USA, 102 (or 30 per cent) were foreign-born. Compare that to Japan, which counts no foreign-born individuals among its nine Nobel laureates. We would be hard-pressed to find any scientific discipline whose leadership does not include people born outside of the United States. The anti-immigrant sentiment fuelled by the current administration will make America a less attractive place for international students and researchers. The administration claims not to be against international students, but they are welcome only if they hold no political views. This is reminiscent of Great Britain, which until 1829 was more than willing to extend democratic privileges to Irishmen as long as they did not profess Catholic beliefs.

Ironically, attempts to make America great again seem to think that destroying the institutions that made American science great is the best place to begin. These draconian measures have their roots in a belief that American universities are home to a woke culture that must be rooted out by any means. Ostensibly, this is to prevent activism around Gaza to prevent antisemitism. However, using the cudgel of financial and administrative power to humble universities that have taken pride in self-governance and openness to diverse viewpoints does not simply curb political dissent; it risks damming the fountain of their creativity. The only two-time unshared Nobel Prize winner, Linus Pauling’s life, offers an interesting example. Pauling received a prize in Chemistry as well as the Peace Prize for his crusade against nuclear weapons, a crusade that came under scrutiny from Senator McCarthy and led to tensions with his home institution, the California Institute of Technology. These tensions led to his leaving CalTech, and as historian of science Jeffrey Kovac notes, stunted the productivity of his later years. Unfortunately, the costs of the road not taken are rarely visible, except through the eyes of history.

There is a lesson and an opportunity for nations that seek to compete with America by enhancing their scientific infrastructure. The lesson lies in heightened appreciation of what made the American innovation economy function — institutional structures that provide support without stifling creativity and innovation, not using political ideologies to guide funding or regulations. Opportunity lies in a vacuum that is likely to be created and spaces that can be filled by less dogmatic nations in fields like climate science and vaccine technologies. As India seeks to enhance its innovation ecosystem, it is worthwhile to pay attention to opportunities and lessons from the selfinflicted wounds on American science. 

Kanakia is the founding president of Maker Bhavan Foundation, and Desai is professor and centre director at NCAER National Data Innovation Centre. Views are personal

India’s national river linking project will cost us dearly

India’s water crisis is not only about scarcity. It is mismanagement, over extraction of groundwater and pollution that are the real culprits

In a country where nearly 600 million people face high to extreme water stress and where per capita water availability has dropped sharply from 5,177 m³ in 1951 to about 1,400 m³ today, water security has rightly taken centre stage in policy discussions.

The government’s flagship plan, the National River Linking Project (NRLP), proposes nothing short of a hydrological transformation on a grand scale: linking over 60 rivers, building a canal network of 15,000 km, connecting 3,000 reservoirs, and transferring 174 billion m³ of water every year from the so-called surplus basins to deficit regions.

The price tag? A staggering Rs 8.5 lakh crore, a figure that could rise to Rs 21.9 lakh crore as inflation, execution delays, and project complexities pile up.

At the heart of this ambitious programme is the Ken-Betwa Link Project (KBLP), the first river-linking project to take off on the ground. With an estimated cost of Rs 44,605 crore, the KBLP plans to divert water from the Ken River in Madhya Pradesh to the Betwa River in Uttar Pradesh. The promise is irrigation for 10.6 lakh hectares of farmland, drinking water supply for 62 lakh people, and 130 MW of hydropower generation along with solar energy. The key infrastructure includes a 77-metre-high Daudhan Dam and a 221-km canal cutting across the drought-hit Bundelkhand region.

However, as work begins, serious cracks are emerging in the grand narrative.

– The Human Cost: The project is set to displace at least 21 villages, home to over 7,000 families, many of whom belong to the Gond and Kol tribal communities. It is not just about losing farmland—ancestral homes, cultural heritage, and forest-based livelihoods all are at stake. The compensation being offered ranges from a meagre Rs 7.5 lakh to Rs 12.5 lakh per household, barely enough to buy equivalent land elsewhere, let alone rebuild lives from scratch.

– Ignoring Ecology: One of the biggest ecological casualties of the Ken-Betwa project is the Panna Tiger Reserve, a sanctuary where tigers were carefully reintroduced after local extinction in 2009. The project will submerge nearly 98 sq km of this delicate ecosystem, amounting to 18% of the reserve’s core area, putting at risk not only tigers but also gharials, vultures, and many other species unique to this habitat.

While the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) has cleared the project, the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) has flagged this clearance as a violation of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. The law clearly prohibits such diversion of river flows unless it directly benefits the wildlife, a condition that has not been convincingly demonstrated here. Independent experts, including those appointed by the Supreme Court, have also raised serious doubts about the project’s hydrological assumptions and its ecological justification. To make matters worse, the project’s assessment of “surplus” water in the Ken basin is based on yield estimates from as far back as 2003, failing to consider updated hydrological data and the increasing uncertainties posed by climate change.

– The Climate Challenge: The core idea of moving “surplus” water from one basin to another overlooks the profound changes in rainfall patterns brought about by climate change. India’s monsoon, which provides 80% of its annual rainfall, has become highly erratic. Recent estimates warn that inter-basin water transfers could actually reduce rainfall in dry regions like Rajasthan by up to 12% while increasing rainfall in wetter basins by around 10%—thus worsening both droughts and floods.

Research from IIT Bombay suggests that large-scale irrigation from river-linking could disrupt local land-atmosphere feedback loops, potentially affecting the monsoon cycle across the subcontinent. History offers sobering lessons from the ecological disasters of the Kissimmee River restoration in the US, the shrinking Aral Sea, and other large-scale hydrological interventions.

It is important to recognise that India’s water crisis is not just about scarcity. Mismanagement, pollution, and over-extraction of groundwater, which currently provides 85% of rural and 50% of urban drinking water, are the real culprits.

– The Economic Reality Check: With Rs 45,000 crore earmarked for the Ken-Betwa project alone, the economic feasibility of such ventures deserves close examination. Once maintenance, ecological restoration, and rehabilitation costs are included, the expenses could easily double over the project’s lifetime.

– A key question arises: what if these massive investments were directed instead towards micro-irrigation, rainwater harvesting, wastewater recycling, or smart technologies like IoT-based precision agriculture? Studies show that micro-irrigation alone can improve water-use efficiency by 30-70% and increase crop yields by 20-90% without displacing people or harming wildlife. Global examples should also serve as cautionary tales. China’s South-North Water Transfer Project displaced over three lakh people and caused widespread ecological damage. Yet, India seems determined to follow the same path, positioning river-linking as the ultimate solution for water scarcity.

– The Smarter Path Ahead: Rather than relying solely on heavy engineering, India should focus on integrated water resource management at the basin level. This includes improving demand-side efficiency, encouraging water-saving technologies, and promoting decentralised, community-led solutions.

Local innovations like the Mangal Turbine, developed by a farmer in Bundelkhand in 1987 as a low-cost irrigation alternative, are examples of homegrown ideas that deserve more attention and support. Further, strengthening River Basin Authorities under Article 262 of the Constitution, alongside effective interstate cooperation and transparent public participation, could resolve disputes and lead to more sustainable outcomes.

Mohapatra is with IIT Jodhpur, and Mitra is with NCAER. Views are personal.

Monthly Economic Review: April 2025

In the Review, we summarise the economic and policy developments in India; monitor global developments of relevance to India; and showcase the pulse of the economy through an analysis of high-frequency indicators and the heat map.

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Counting Handloom Weavers in India

How many handloom weavers are there in India? According to the 4th All India Handloom Census (2019–20), there are 26,73,891 handloom weavers and 8,48,621 allied workers in the country. In other words, there are a total of 35.2 lakh handloom weavers in the country.

Challenges in Estimating the Number of Handloom Weavers in India: A Comparison of Data Sources
The Handloom Census counts total number of weavers and allied weavers’ households by the presence of looms in their household. There were 1.12 workers per household in 2019–20. This makes sense as a ‘handloom’ is defined as “a loom that is used to weave cloth without the use of any electricity. Hand weaving is done on pit looms or frame looms generally located in weavers’ homes. Weaving is primarily the interlacing of two sets of yarn – the warp (length) and the weft (width).”

The Handloom Census also probes household members about the weaving activity undertaken in the previous one year. The total number of handloom worker households went up from 27.8 lakh in 2009–10 to 31.4 lakh in 2019–20. However, the number of workers came down from 43.32 lakh in 2010–11 to 35.2 lakh in 2019–20. The differences in trends between households and workers is quite puzzling.  Bhowmik (2019) points that the increase in handloom households over a decade is counterintuitive to ground reality. One explanation could be the rise in employment intensity i.e. the number of person days rose from 183 days in the 3rd Handloom Census to 208 days in the 4th Handloom Census.

The Periodic Labour Force Survey data (PLFS) is the main source of data on workers in the country. It is a household survey which probes the members of their household about the usual principal activity and subsidiary activity of the household members. The principal activity status of a person is that activity where he/she is engaged for a relatively longer period of the year (183 days and above). On the other hand, the subsidiary status is where the person is engaged for relatively lesser number of days (>30 days and <183 days). One of the limitations of PLFS is that it is unable to capture the number of seasonal migrant workers. Its unit of enumeration is the household, and it includes only those household members who have been continuously staying in the house for at least six months. This could be one of the reasons for some handloom workers getting excluded from PLFS and its undercounting the number of workers.

The PLFS measures gives estimates of workers at the National Industrial Classification (NIC) at 5-digit and the National Classification of Occupations (NCO) at 3-digit level. When one analyses the data from the PLFS, using NIC code at the 4–digit level (NIC code 1312, weaving of textiles) and the NCO code at the 3–digit level (731), one finds that there were only 14.5 lakh weavers in the country. Of this, 97.3 per cent were engaged in the sector as principal workers and 2.7 per cent were engaged as subsidiary workers. Further, one is unable to distinguish between power loom and handloom weavers because the data are at the NCO 3-digit level, which is the same for both types of workers. The NCO 2015–16 assigns the 8–digit code, 7318.5800 to a handloom weaver and 7318.5500 as a power loom weaver. The PLFS indicates that the number of handloom weavers were much smaller than the Handloom Census.

Then one looks at the available Enterprise Survey data. The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and the ASUSE (Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises) data are available for both handloom and power loom sub-sectors. The ASI data accounts for organised workforce in textile weaving sector and ASUSE data accounts for unorganised workforce. The ASI and ASUSE Surveys ask firms about their workers, but it is not mapped to occupations. The two databases combined shows that there were 13.8 lakh weavers in the country. Again, these two surveys also indicate a far lower number of handloom weavers than the Handloom Census.

Thus, we see that differences in methodologies are yielding different numbers. So, which is a more reliable measure – the Handloom Census or the PLFS or the ASI/ASUSE?

The differences in number throw challenges for policymakers, as several policies are designed based on these data. Therefore, policymakers are recommended to conduct a pilot using different methodologies to estimate number of workers and assess which methodology yields a more precise number. They may also adopt the usage of NCO 8–digit code.

Disclaimer from the Authors: Views are personal and do not reflect that of NCAER.

NCAER News: April 2025

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