India Human Development Survey: February 2026

The IHDS Forum is a monthly update of socio-economic developments in India by the IHDS research community, based on the India Human Development Survey, jointly conducted by NCAER and the University of Maryland. While two earlier rounds of the survey were completed in 2004-05 and 2011-12, respectively. Fieldwork for the third round was undertaken in 2022-24 and the data is currently being cleaned and processed.

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Stubble Burning: Can Delhi Turn a Challenge Into An Opportunity?

Delhi consistently ranks among the world’s most polluted cities, posing a severe public health threat to over 30 million residents and shortening life expectancy by up to 12 years.

Summary of this article

  • Pollution sources vary sharply by season: dust dominates summer air, while winter pollution is driven overwhelmingly (85–94%) by combustion sources such as vehicles, industry and biomass burning
  • Farm fires in Punjab and Haryana, driven by short crop cycles and economic pressures, significantly spike Delhi’s pollution.
  • Converting agricultural residue into biomass pellets and biochar can cut pollution, sequester carbon, and reduce reliance on coal

Delhi, India’s national capital, arguably has the worst air quality in the world. According to the World’s Most Polluted Cities report by IQ Air, it ranked second over the past decade. Each winter, heavy smog and multiple pollution sources push the Air Quality Index (AQI) beyond 500, equivalent to smoking 33–50 cigarettes a day. In 2020 alone, this pollution was linked to around 54,000 deaths and economic losses of $8.1 billion. Recent studies warn that the 30 million people living in the National Capital Region could lose up to 12 years of life expectancy due to prolonged exposure to toxic air.

Studies show clear seasonal shifts in Delhi’s pollution sources. In summer, dust accounts for around 31–34 per cent of pollution, but this falls to 6–15 per cent in winter. During winter, combustion sources, such as vehicles, industry and biomass burning, dominate, contributing 85–94 per cent of overall pollution.

To curb peak pollution during periods like winter and Diwali, authorities impose measures including odd–even traffic rules, construction bans to control dust, and schemes to discourage farm residue burning through in-situ management. Despite these efforts, biomass burning remains a major concern, peaking at around 26 per cent in winter and 22 per cent in summer, even under strict regulations.  (Table 1).

Table 1 Percentage share of pollution sources in Delhi

 Photo: Source-Department of Environment, GNCTD 2023

Changes in legislation in 2009 left farmers with just a 25-day window between harvesting rice and sowing wheat. Burning crop residue is the quickest and cheapest way to clear fields, but this practice, known as stubble burning, has become a major contributor to Delhi’s winter air pollution. Although banned in 2015, it continues, albeit at lower levels, and has previously accounted for up to 50 per cent of early winter pollution.

When farmers in Punjab and Haryana burn stubble, air quality in Delhi deteriorates sharply. On 16 October, the Supreme Court criticised both states for poor enforcement. While Punjab cut stubble fires by 42.8 per cent between 2021 and 2024, Haryana recorded a worrying 222.6 per cent increase over a similar period, worsening winter smog.

A sustainable alternative lies in converting surplus agricultural biomass into bioenergy. Using crop residue to produce clean energy can reduce pollution while delivering wider environmental and social benefits across air, water and land.

Biomass pellets are made from compressed organic matter, primarily agricultural residues of primarily  rice husk and wheat straws. When these are converted into pallets, it becomes a non-polluting or even significantly lower polluting form of fuel than traditional residue burning.

Biochar or biological charcoal is produced naturally in the forest over the years when the  vegetation is left to smolder (flameless combustion) in layers on the forest floor following a forest fire. Today, with the help of modern technology, it is made with the help of pyrolysis in a biochar klin. The biomass of different kinds is slowly baked until it becomes a carbon-rich char. [1] Pyrolysis, unlike combustion, traps carbon in solid biochar instead of releasing CO₂. For example, one ton of biochar sequesters carbon equivalent to 3.6 tons of CO₂ that would otherwise emit through natural decay. This makes the use of bioenergy a great way for carbon sequestration as well.

India’s bioenergy sector faces critical challenges in scaling up, despite its renewable energy potential. The seasonal availability of agricultural residues creates unstable feedstock supplies, while high transportation costs of 20-30 per cent make biomass less competitive against subsidized fossil fuels. Quality inconsistency in biomass pellets, due to lack of uniform standards, undermines market confidence even with existing policies like SATAT[2].

Financial viability remains difficult with bioenergy costs of ₹5-7/kWh competing against cheaper coal and solar. Key solutions include establishing farm-level processing units, enforcing quality standards, and implementing financial mechanisms like carbon pricing to boost competitiveness. Addressing these supply chain, quality and financial barriers through coordinated action is essential for sector growth.[3]

Bioenergy offers a viable alternative to India’s highly carbon-intensive coal. Organisations such as NTPC are already using biomass pellets to cut emissions from coal-fired power plants. With rapid growth in green energy and stronger climate commitments under India’s NDCs, bioenergy could play a key role in the country’s renewable energy future if developed sustainably.

The NCAER Business Expectations Survey for India Third Quarter 2025–26

The National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), one of India’s premier economic policy research think tanks, carried out the 135th Round of its Business Expectations Survey (BES) in December 2025. NCAER has been carrying out the BES every quarter since 1992, covering 500 firms across four regions.

India-EU FTA: Why paperless trade readiness is the real test

India’s Free Trade Agreement with the European Union is being sold as a diplomatic breakthrough. Some in Europe have called it the “mother of all deals”. India should treat it as something else: a compliance test that can be turned into a growth lever only if domestic systems are fixed first.

That is why the hard work begins in logistics. This is the plumbing of trade. If India wants the India-EU FTA to lift exports and draw deeper into value chains, it must reduce the time and cost of moving goods across borders. The fastest route is dull but decisive: fully digital, paperless trade processes that work across ports, ICDs, land customs stations, and state jurisdictions.

Cross-border data interoperability

This push is not happening in a vacuum. It sits neatly within the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, especially Articles 7 and 10, and aligns with regional efforts such as the UN/ESCAP Agreement on Cross-border Paperless Trade. The intent is clear: predictable, interoperable data flows that reduce discretion and friction at the border.

But the self-congratulation is premature. The claim that India is “fully ready” to lead paperless trade overlooks structural bottlenecks that have not moved fast enough. Legal misalignments persist. Digital platforms remain fragmented. Border infrastructure is uneven. The real question is not whether India should pursue digital trade leadership. It is whether policy ambition is finally matched by institutional readiness to deliver digitally authenticated cross-border commerce that is accepted abroad.

Paperless trade infrastructure gaps

The optimistic story collapses at the state level and at smaller border points. Paperless processes may work on a few major corridors. They are not universal across India’s border crossings.

Many locations still run on unreliable internet connectivity, patchy digital infrastructure, and inconsistent local practices. In such settings, electronic documentation is a fair-weather promise. The moment a consignment moves beyond the port gate, traders revert to paper because the system cannot be trusted end-to-end.

TIR transit system and India’s limited access to European corridors

The same mismatch shows up in transit facilitation. The TIR initiative has a clear logic: faster movement across multimodal corridors with lighter customs burdens. India has made it technically operational with some neighbouring partners. Yet it has not been able to deploy TIR for shipments to its principal export markets in Europe, where the commercial payoff would be larger.

So India still does not enjoy the “single-seal, single-exit” transit that established corridors offer. That limits TIR’s strategic value and exposes a wider gap: India’s transit facilitation ecosystem is not yet built for scale across key trade partners.

Cross-border paperless trade compliance risks for small traders

There is also a distributional problem that policy often forgets. Strict digital compliance requirements can sideline the very actors who dominate India’s cross-border trade in many regions: informal and small-scale traders.

Along borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, commerce often runs on low-bandwidth connectivity, limited digital literacy, and minimal formal documentation. If digital submissions become mandatory without a transition ramp, this segment could be excluded altogether. That would be an own goal. A reform meant to improve inclusion would deepen exclusion and damage subregional integration and livelihoods.

Interoperability across Customs, DGFT, GSTN and port systems

The belief that paperless trade will yield quick efficiency gains is also economically naïve. Digital systems pay off over time, but they demand heavy upfront investment: training, redesigned procedures, system integration, cybersecurity, and continuous fixes.

India’s trade architecture is still split across incompatible platforms and workflows. Customs, DGFT, GSTN, port systems, and state agencies do not behave like one system. Interoperability is the difference between digitisation and digital trade. Without harmonised rules on e-signatures, authentication, electronic transferable records, and cross-border recognition of digital documents, India may only create digital paperwork that fails legal tests abroad.

Policy flexibility and strategic autonomy

Finally, timing matters. Premature accession to strict cross-border paperless trade commitments could constrain policy flexibility at a moment when strategic autonomy is not a slogan but a requirement.

Binding obligations on standards and timelines can push India into choices that do not match regulatory capacity, development needs, or security priorities. A move branded as progress towards “Viksit Bharat” could, if rushed, reduce India’s room to innovate and protect domestic interests in a fast-evolving global digital trade regime.

The real test for India-EU FTA

Cross-border paperless trade can power India’s next leap. But only if the tracks are laid before the train is flagged off.

Rushing ahead without strengthening interoperability, legal harmonisation, and small-trader readiness risks derailing the gains the India-EU FTA is expected to deliver. The practical agenda is clear. Build digital capacity across all ports and border points. Align laws and recognition frameworks so documents are valid across jurisdictions. Make inclusion a design feature, not a speech line.

The question is not whether India should board the digital train. It is whether the rails are inclusive, resilient, and strong enough to carry every segment of India’s trade economy into the future.

Sanjib Pohit is a Professor, and Sovini Mondal is a Research Associate at the National Council of Applied Economic Research. Views expressed here are personal.

AI and the Road to Vikshit Bharat

As India hosts the AI Summit this week, the event must be viewed not as a technology showcase, but as a development inflection point. Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming foundational infrastructure — comparable to electricity, highways, or digital payments. The central question before India is whether AI will remain a private efficiency tool or evolve into a public productivity multiplier aligned with the vision of Vikshit Bharat@2047.

India’s development ambition rests on sustained high growth, improved human capital, stronger rural incomes, and efficient public service delivery. AI has the potential to accelerate each of these — provided it is embedded within policy architecture rather than treated as a standalone innovation.

The economic case is clear. Government assessments note that AI is expected to contribute significantly to India’s digital economy expansion over the coming decade. The IndiAI Mission, approved with a substantial public outlay (Rs. 10372 crore over a period of 5 years), reflects recognition that AI capabilities — compute infrastructure, datasets, research capacity, and skilling — must be treated as strategic national assets. This is not merely about startups; it is about national competitiveness and productivity.

In agriculture, which continues to employ a large share of the workforce, AI-enabled applications are already demonstrating measurable impact. Government pilots integrating artificial intelligence with weather forecasting, satellite imagery, and crop advisory services have reached millions of farmers across states. Evaluations indicate that a substantial proportion of participating farmers adjusted sowing decisions based on AI-driven monsoon forecasts. In a climate-stressed agricultural system, even modest improvements in decision-making translate into income stability and reduced risk exposure. Similarly, AI-based analytics are increasingly being deployed for crop health monitoring, soil assessment, and precision input management under government-supported initiatives. These applications support better water use efficiency and productivity — critical for sustaining agricultural growth under resource constraints.

In healthcare, AI is being positioned as a force multiplier for India’s primary health system. Government-supported innovations in AI-assisted diagnostics — including tools for tuberculosis screening and early disease detection — aim to compensate for shortages of specialist manpower in rural districts. By integrating such systems within public health networks, India can improve early detection rates, reduce referral burdens, and foster long-term treatment costs. The broader economic returns of preventive and early-stage intervention are well-documented in public health research.

Education and skilling form another crucial pillar of the Vikshit Bharat strategy. India’s demographic dividend will yield economic gains only if learning outcomes improve and workforce skills evolve alongside technological change. AI-powered adaptive learning tools, developed and piloted within government platforms, are being used to personalise instruction and identify learning gaps. If scaled responsibly — with teacher training and infrastructure support — such tools can help narrow regional disparities in foundational literacy and numeracy.

The governance dividend may prove equally significant. India’s experience with Digital Public Infrastructure has demonstrated how interoperable platforms can transform service delivery. Unified digital payments and direct benefit transfer systems have improved transparency and reduced leakages. AI-enabled workflow automation, grievance analytics, and fraud detection can deepen these efficiency gains. By reducing administrative friction, AI can strengthen state capacity — an often overlooked but essential driver of long-term growth.

However, evidence from past technological transitions also offers caution. Gains from digitalisation have been uneven across states, reflecting differences in institutional readiness and absorptive capacity. Technology amplifies policy — it does not substitute for it. For AI to meaningfully contribute to Vikshit Bharat, three policy anchors are essential.

First, public AI infrastructure. Shared datasets, compute capacity, and testing sandboxes — governed by clear privacy and security standards — can democratise innovation and reduce duplication. The IndiAI Mission’s emphasis on common infrastructure must translate into operational access for states, research institutions, and startups.

Second, human capital alignment. AI deployment must be accompanied by systematic skilling initiatives across sectors. Teachers, extension officers, health workers, and administrators require training to effectively use AI systems. Without complementary human investment, productivity gains will remain limited.

Third, regulatory clarity and accountability. High-stakes applications in health, finance, and governance demand auditability and transparent standards. Trust will determine adoption. Clear guidelines for procurement, testing, and oversight can encourage innovation while safeguarding public interest.

The AI Summit, therefore, should be judged not by memoranda signed but by follow-through: institutional mechanisms created, budgetary scaled, and measurable improvements delivered. If AI becomes embedded within agriculture missions, public health systems, education reforms, and governance processes — supported by public digital infrastructure — it can accelerate India’s development trajectory.

India has previously demonstrated its ability to adapt frontier technologies to public purpose. The opportunity now is to extend that model to artificial intelligence. Done right, AI will not merely power new applications; it will underpin the structural transformation required for a developed India. Therefore, the summit marks a moment of choice. Whether it becomes a turning point in India’s development story will depend on disciplined execution long after the delegates depart.

The writer is Senior Fellow at NCAER, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.

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